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LIGHTING UP THE FOREIGN CORRUPT
PRACTICES ACT: A CASE STUDY OF U.S.
TOBACCO INDUSTRY POLITICAL INFLUENCE
BUYING IN JAPAN
Mark Levint
"If we admit that smoking is harmful to heavy smokers, do we
not admit that BAT [British American Tobacco]' has killed a lot
of people each year for a very long time? Moreover, if the
evidence we have today is not significantly different from the
evidence we had five years ago, might it not be argued that we
have been 'willfully' killing our customersfor this longperiod?"2
"There is goldfor you. Sell me your good report."3
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I. Introduction
On November 26, 1974, Kakuei Tanaka resigned as prime
minister of Japan due to a recent exposure of political corruption.4
Now commonly known as "Japan's Watergate,"' the event
originated from massive bribes provided by the Lockheed
Corporation to obtain Tanaka's influence in the Japanese
military's purchase of Lockheed aircraft.6 As the most notorious
4 Two years after his resignation, Tanaka was arrested for accepting bribes from
the Lockheed Corporation. The former premier never served his sentence for influence
peddling since he died while appealing the case. James Sterngold, Kakuei Tanaka, 75,
Ex-Premier and Political Force in Japan, Dies, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1993, at B14.
Remarkably, the Supreme Court lost its records concerning this case. Top Court Loses
Lockheed Records, JAPAN TIMES, March 23, 2004, at 2.
5 MARK D. WEST, SECRETS, SEX, AND SPECTACLE: THE RULES OF SCANDAL IN
JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES 23 (2006).
6 See JAMES BABB, TANAKA: THE MAKING OF POSTWAR JAPAN 95-99 (2000).
Technically, Japan's 1947 "Peace Constitution" bars the nation from having a military,
and it only maintains self-defense forces. KENPO, art. 9. The connotation is, however,
misleading. See, e.g., Kenneth L. Port, Article 9 of The Japanese Constitution and The
Rule Of Law, 13 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 127, 147 (2005) ("The data describing
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in Japan's long post-war history of political scandals,7 the events

shook both Japan's political arena and its economic markets with
the energy of a major earthquake.
Although influence peddling surely was not new to the world
at the time, 8 the United States Congress was dismayed to have the
government of a key ally in Cold War geopolitics fall into political
turmoil, especially when the agencies of American business
produced that turmoil. Consequently, in the midst of political
reforms that emerged from the Watergate scandal in the United

States, Congress enacted far-reaching legislation, the Foreign
This act aimed to prevent
Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).9
American commercial enterprises, or their agents, from
participating in high-level corruption abroad that might be harmful
to American diplomatic or geopolitical interests.
Nonetheless, ten years after the Watergate and Lockheed
scandals, and just five years after the enactment of the FCPA, the
senior-most executives of the Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corporation (B&W) developed a plan to provide cash and other
benefits to one of Japan's most powerful political insiders and a
close confidant of then Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone. These
plans appeared explicitly in confidential documents that became
public through civil litigation discovery in the late 1990s.' ° The
documents show that B&W's executives, including its chairman
and its director of marketing research services, participated in the
the level of Japan's commitment to the SDF is astounding. The data indicates that Japan
is far from a pacifist nation. Japan ranks fourth in overall military spending.").
7 See, e.g., GERALD L. CURTIS, THE JAPANESE WAY OF POLITICS 163 (1988) (noting

how "The Lockheed scandal ...rocked Japan's political world as had no previous
scandal.").
8 As to Western traditions, see, e.g., Bribery-The Tradition, http://law.jrank.org/
pages/572/Bribery-tradition.html.
9 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 to § 78ff).
10 These documents were first revealed by Dr. Mary Assunta Kolandai in her
outstanding doctoral dissertation, Mary Assunta Kolandai, The Tobacco Industry in
Japan and its Influence on Tobacco Control 127-29 (Aug. 2007) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, The University of Sydney) (on file with author), available at
Dr.
http://tobacco.health.usyd.edu.au/site/supersite/resources/pdfs/AssuntaPhD.pdf.
Assunta's massive work draws from interviews, tobacco industry documents and other
materials and presents a comprehensive picture of Japanese tobacco control policy, the
Japanese tobacco industry, and foreign tobacco multinational business in Japan through
2006. Dr. Assunta, a researcher at the University of Sydney, appropriately presented this
story as an example of unethical and corrupt industry activity in Japan. This paper layers
on top of her discovery the additional element of that activity's apparent illegality under
U.S. law. Id.
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plan to be effectuated in a highly secret face-to-face meeting with
a key Japanese politician at the Regency Hotel in New York City
in August 1983.1 Although the precise details of what transpired
at that meeting remain hidden and key individuals have passed
away, the documents alone reveal a telling story.
Lockheed's run of global corruption was unethical but not yet
illegal under U.S. law in the 1970s. But, by 1983, when B&W
was planning the August meeting, Congress had codified the
illegality of payoffs to influential government officials. 2 Thus,
B&W officials should have been well aware that the activities
described in the plans, if carried out, would have been illegal
under U.S. law.' 3 Had these industry documents emerged in a
timely fashion, B&W's chairman and senior-most executives
should have been investigated for serious crimes with penalties,
including up to five years of imprisonment 4 for the individuals
involved. '"

Whatever the B&W officials did, it seems as though they got
away with it. The five-year statute of limitations has run, 6 and
most of the individuals involved have passed away.17
This Article begins by presenting the historical record of
B&W's contemplated political influence buying in Japan as
demonstrated by the tobacco industry documents in Part J."

I

I As this paper is being written, the Regency Hotel has just come into view as the
purported location of an even more newsworthy scandalous liaison. See Serge F.
Kovaleski and Mike Mclntire, Lawyers' Ties Hint at Extent of Hiding Edwards's Affair,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2008 at Al. The Regency Hotel is where former U.S. Senator
John Edwards and Rielle Hunter are said to have first met. Id.
12 FCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(a).
13 Id.

14 The version of the FCPA in effect at the time imposed a fine of "not more than
$10,000, or imprisonment not more than five years, or both" for willful violations of the
FCPA. FCPA, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1971).
15 Nakao, the lead Japanese protagonist in this scheme, would also have been
scandalized and perhaps indicted under Japanese law. Nonetheless, his corrupt nature
emerged in a later scandal, which ultimately resulted in a felony conviction for accepting
massive bribes and a twenty-two month prison sentence (that he avoided due to health
reasons). See discussion infra note 87 and accompanying text.
16 "Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, no person shall be prosecuted,
tried, or punished for any offense, not capital, unless the indictment is found or the
information is instituted within five years next after such offense shall have been
committed." 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a) (2008).
17 See discussion infra notes 75-76, 79 and accompanying text.
18 These are available via the Legacy Tobacco Documents Library, a searchable
online archive operated by the University of California, San Francisco of more than 9.9
million documents (51+ million pages).
Legacy Tobacco Documents Library,
http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/about/about-the-library.jsp (last visited Feb. 5, 2009). The
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While Japan was still reeling from its Lockheed scandal, the
"same old thing" was happening again at the highest levels
between the chairman of B&W and a very close associate of the
Japanese Prime Minister, aiming to influence the Prime Minister's
actions and the actions of what was then a public corporation, the
Japan Tobacco and Salt Public Corporation (JTS). 9 Next, Part III
of this article analyzes those facts under the terms of the FCPA in
effect at the time 20 and concludes that the documents reveal a plan
that, if carried out, constituted a felony.
Admittedly, it is impossible to determine whether the activities
of B&W were unique or represent only the tip of the iceberg of
how tobacco industry executives have operated to secure highlevel political influence throughout the world. Other corrupt
engagements are suggested in published reports regarding
Malaysia and the Czech Republic. 2' Moreover, a 2000 World
Health Organization (WHO) report carefully documented the
tobacco industry's corrupt efforts to influence WHO's policies.22
Library is available at the following website: http://Iegacy.library.ucsf.edu/ (last visited
Feb. 5, 2009). The collection includes documents exposed by tobacco industry
whistleblowers and civil litigation discovery in the United States and United Kingdom.
Legacy Tobacco Documents Library, http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/abut/aboutcolle tion
s.jsp (last visited Feb. 5, 2009).
19 See infra text accompanying notes 48-58. Japan Tobacco and Salt Public
Corporation (JTS) is the antecessor to Japan Tobacco, Inc. (JTI), which emerged from
JTS's so-called privatization in 1985. For an extensive history of Japan's tobacco
monopoly and its privatization, see Mark A. Levin, Smoke Around the Rising Sun: An
American Look at Tobacco Regulation in Japan, 8 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 99, 101-02
(1997).
20 The law has since been substantively revised several times, with major changes
enacted in both 1988 and 1998. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub.
L. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107 (1988); International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act
of 1998, Pub. L. 105-366, 112 Stat. 3302 (1998).
21 See M. Assunta & S. Chapman, A Mire of Highly Subjective and Ineffective
Voluntary Guidelines: Tobacco Industry Efforts to Thwart Tobacco Control in
Malaysia, 13 TOBACCO CONTROL (SuPP. 2) ii43,

ii46-ii47 (2004), available at

http://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/cgi/content/ful13/suppl_2/ii43; BBC News, Monitoring,
Czech Minister Offers to Resign over Party Funding Scandal, Feb. 16, 1998,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/monitoring/57266.stm.
While nothing in the report
directly points to any corrupt activity, another work that also reveals a truly
extraordinary level of political influence by the tobacco transnational British American
Tobacco is Anna Gilmore et al., Transnational Tobacco Company Influence on Tax
Policy During Privatization of a State Monopoly: British American Tobacco and
Uzbekistan, 97 AM. J.PUB. HEALTH 2001 (2007).
22 COMM. OF EXPERTS ON TOBACCO INDUS. DOc., WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION,
TOBACCO COMPANY STRATEGIES TO UNDERMINE TOBACCO CONTROL ACTIVITIES AT THE
WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION (July 2000), available at http://www.who.int/tobacco

/media/en/who_inquiry.pdf. Here too, the FCPA might have been implicated except that
at the time of the reported WHO interference, the FCPA did not apply to bribery of
officials of public international organizations. This was put into the law in the 1998
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These circumstances bolster the implications of the potential
illegality portrayed in B&W's story. Therefore, in Part IV, this
article proposes a number of specific actions beginning with a
comprehensive investigation by the United States Department of
Justice and Congress into the U.S. tobacco industry's political
actions abroad. Appropriate measures with regard to U.S. tobacco
industry political activities abroad must be integrated into the
pending legislation for regulation of tobacco products by the U.S.
Food and Drug Administration in a manner that goes far beyond
the currently proposed approach.
Furthermore, just as
international measures under the WHO Framework Convention
for Tobacco Control (FCTC) must play a role in the future
directions of U.S. policy, the FCTC's Conference of the Parties
should also take immediate action to address this issue.23
Part V concludes this Article with a broader contemplation of
the criminality of the tobacco industry's handiwork. The business
advantage potentially obtained by B&W through its corrupt
connection to Japanese politicians would have resulted in Japanese
citizens' deaths. 24 And so perhaps the individuals involved did not
just get away with violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.
It might be considered whether the individuals involved got away
with murder.
25
II. N and Y's Excellent Adventure

A. B& W's March 1983 Tokyo Visit
In mid-March of 1983, a New York-based business consultant
named Marvin Stein, working as a special consultant for B&W,
traveled to Tokyo with Dr. George E. Stungis, B&W's director of
marketing research services.26 They met high-level officials at
JTS, other senior Japanese government officials, a representative
from the press, and Mike Mansfield, the United States'
revision. International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105366, § 2, 112 Stat. 3302 (1998).
23 See discussion infra Part IV.
24 See discussion infra Part V.
25 Cf BILL AND TED'S EXCELLENT ADVENTURE (Orion Pictures 1989) (describing a
different kind of trip back through time).
26 Stungis' job title is not indicated in these documents. His identity is provided in
THE CIGARETrE PAPERS

360 (Stanton A.Glantz et al. eds.,

1996), available at

http://ark.cdlib.org/ark:/13030/ft8489p25j/ (follow "Chapter 9 Stonewalling: Politics and
Public Relations" hyperlink).

2009

POLITICAL INFLUENCE BUYING IN JAPAN

ambassador to Japan at the time.27 Upon his return, Stein prepared
a detailed memo for B&W Chairman I.W. Hughes, to be delivered
via Stungis.28
This memo, dated March 25, 1983, lays out the framework that
Stein, Stungis, and B&W's lead staffer in Japan, Joel Silverstein,29
had put into place during the trip. The memo carefully details the
company's strategy to buy top-level influence in the Japanese
government in two regards: shaping the Prime Minister's trade
policy on foreign tobacco imports and effectuating a new licensing
arrangement for B&W with JTS that would outperform B&W's
existing import partner's results. 3' The linchpin in enabling these
changes was Stein's personal friendships with an influential
Japanese businessman, Kazuyuki Yokoyama, and more
importantly, with a senior elected official, Mr. Eiichi Nakao, "a
key backer of Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro [and] one of the
most influential members of the 150-man agricultural bloc in the
Diet (Parliament)., 3 At the time, the agricultural bloc was among
the most significant, if not the most significant, in Japanese
domestic political affairs.32 In this regard, Nakao was an
27 Memorandum from Marvin H. Stein, Special Consultant, Brown & Williamson,

to I.W. Hughes, Chairman, Brown & Williamson, Summary Report on Japan Trip (Mar.
25, 1983), Bates No. 640512711/2719, http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/dgq90f0/pdf
[hereinafter Stein, Summary Report].
28 Id.

29 Id. This memo does not explicitly mention Stungis as Stein's travel partner in
Tokyo. However, Stungis' involvement is documented in at least two letters that Stungis
sent after the trip to senior officials in Tokyo with whom he and Stein had met together.
Letter from G.E. Stungis, Dir. of Mkt. and Research Services, Brown & Williamson
Tobacco, to The Honorable Watanabe Hideo, Parliamentary Vice Minister of Int'l Trade
and Indus., Japan (May 23, 1983), Bates No. 501024819, http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/
tid/wpi23fO0/pdf, Letter from G. E.Stungis, Dir. of Mkt. and Research Services, Brown
& Williamson Tobacco, to Akio Takita, Dir., Overseas Div., Japan Tobacco & Salt Pub.
Corp., (May 23, 1983), Bates No. 501024818, http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/
vpi23fU0/pdf. In his letter to Akio Takita, Stungis mentions "Mr. Silverstein" as having
joined the meetings. Id. "Mr. Silverstein" was presumably Joel Silverstein, who is
mentioned in the memo and identified in contemporaneous media reports as B&W's area
manager in Japan. Louis Kraar, Japan Blows Smoke About U.S. Cigarettes, FORTUNE,
Feb. 21, 1983, at 99, 103. Silverstein later became "regional VP-general manager of
B&W (Japan)." David Kilburn, Silverstein's Book Offers Close-up View of Japan,
ADVERTISING AGE, Jan. 2, 1989, at 20.
30 Stein, Summary Report, supra note 27, at -2711. B&W aimed to address both a
declining market trend for Kent in Japan and a frustrating working relationship with JTS
on its brands. See T.E. Whitehair, Jr., Visit Report-Japan (Oct. 14-21, 1981), Oct. 23,
1981, http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/ewo89eOO/pdf at -300-02 (noting that JTS "is
only reluctantly going to cooperate" and describing JTS's obstinate position on Viceroy
brand test marketing) and at -304 (discussing "the declining trend of K[ent] in Japan").
31 Stein, Summary Report, supra note 27, at -2711.
32 See discussion infra note 33.
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extremely influential political figure.3 3
Pursuant to B&W's strategy, Nakao, at first gratis, and later
for a fee,34 was to provide a variety of elements of access and
influence for B&W in Japan. First and most importantly, Nakao
was a close confidant of Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone and
he was to use his influence with the Prime Minister to gain B&W
access to Japan's multi-billion dollar tobacco market.3 5 Nakao
was also to provide B&W influence with JTS officials for the
company's dealings with JTS, affect other parliamentarians within
the crucial bloc of agricultural policy specialists in opening the
tobacco market, and provide a valuable introduction to the leaders
of the unified Japanese agricultural cooperatives vis-A-vis a
possible joint venture in distributing B&W products through the
cooperatives.3 6
The covert nature of Nakao's engagement was clear from the
start. Stein notes: "Needless to say, the public independent image
of Mr. N[akao] (hereinafter, Mr. N) as totally separate and apart
from business involvement must be maintained and protected at all
costs."3 7 A huge payoff "if the Y-N duo succeed" would go to
Yokoyama, who "would expect to receive about one-half of the
royalties on Kent to be licensed by JTS."3 But "Mr. Y will be our
liason [sic] with N in order to insulate N from the commercial
aspects. 39
33 Professor Gerald Curtis's well-known 1988 book provides a careful assessment
of rural voters' sizeable power among various domestic political forces, describing the
rural sector as a contributing factor maintaining the Liberal Democratic Party's durable
electoral strength. CURTIS, supra note 7, at 51. This phenomenon derives from the
party's early roots in rural districts, with that effect first maintained through districting
and then through a strictly-followed seniority system: "The party was almost entirely
rural-based in its early years. Thus, its most powerful politicians ... are almost all from
districts that have strong agricultural lobbies." Id. at 237.
34 See infra text accompanying note 52.
35 Id. Opening Japan's closed market was a crucial target for the U.S. tobacco
industry at the time. See, e.g., Kraar, supra note 29, at 99 (describing Japan as
"potentially the largest overseas customer for U.S. cigarettes" and "the equivalent of
$1.5 billion annually in U.S. exports").

B&W's senior leadership understood this goal,

having identified Japan as "the BWI [Brown & Williamson International] market with
greatest growth potential" in an internal report dated November 30, 1982. Presentation
by Pat Sheehy, Brown & Williamson Tobacco (Nov. 30, 1982), Agenda, Bates No.
670124380, -423, http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/iqfl4f00/pdf.
36 Stein, Summary Report, supra note 27 passim.
37 Jd. at -712.

38
39
royalty
having

Id.
Id. This remark is hazy regarding whether Nakao was to get a portion of the
payoff. But since he and Yokoyama were working clearly as a team, with Nakao
the more significant role, it certainly seems plausible that Nakao would also have
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To ensure the B&W Chairman appreciated Nakao's
extraordinary clout, Stein credited Nakao with "ha[ving] a
previous head of JTS fired for refusing to meet with Congressman
James Jones when he visited Japan."40 Facts such as that JTS was
a vast public enterprise with thirty-six factories, approximately
40,000 employees, and worth an estimated $24 billion, further
indicate Nakao's potent political influence.4 1
Stein's memo suggested a degree of pride in Nakao's4 2
significant influence during B&W's March 1983 Tokyo visit.
Stein credited Nakao with having arranged meetings with three of
the most powerful people in the executive branch of the Japanese
government: the Parliamentary Vice Minister of International
Trade and Industry (the number two official in the Ministry), the
"senior Japanese agricultural official responsible for U.S.-Japanese
agricultural talks," and one of the North America Bureau chiefs at
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.43 Stein similarly credits Nakao's
influence for making the meetings at JTS proceed smoothly,
specifically noting: "Mention of our having had a previous
meeting that day with Mr. N[akao] was also instrumental in
insuring [sic] their cooperation."4 4
B. Planningthe Secret August 1983 Meeting
The March memo anticipates that the arrangement would be
further developed in a follow-up meeting in New York City with
Hughes, Nakao, and Yokoyama attending.45 Their discussions
were to be built upon an anticipated visit to Japan that spring by
Thomas E. Sandefur, Jr., the company's Senior Vice President for
International Marketing, and then later, a personal visit to Japan by
Chairman Hughes.4 6 Most importantly, the plans for this August
shared in the proceeds. See also infra notes 144-145.
40 Stein, Summary Report, supra note 27, at -712.
41 H. YOKOTA, PHILLIP MORRIS, CIGARETTE INDUSTRY IN JAPAN (June 1987), Bates

No. 2504004022/4047, -034, http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/aux32e00/pdf (listing
factory and employee counts); Levin, supra note 19, at 100 n.64 (discussing company
valuation).
42 Stein, Summary Report, supra note 27.
43 Id. at -712.
44 Id. at -713.

45 This meeting between Chairman Hughes, Mr. Nakao, and Mr. Yokoyama was so
covert that it was hidden even from Nakao's official handlers at the Japanese embassies
and consulates. See infra text accompanying note 55.
46 In light of the fact that the documents do not reveal any further information
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meeting laid out specifics regarding the questionable payments
and other benefits to be given to Yokoyama and Nakao for B&W
to secure their further engagement and support.47
The first document contains a set of briefing notes marked
"PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL-SENSITIVE," produced by
Stein for B&W Chairman Hughes dated August 3, 1983.48 The
notes indicate that the purpose of the August meeting was "to
develop a relationship between [Hughes and Nakao]. 49 Stein
explains that Nakao and Yokoyama "will be discreetly
collaborating in enabling [B&W] to improve its overall marketing
position with ...

[JTS]." 5 ° But while other documents are more

obtuse, this document specifically describes a corrupt payment
scheme: "[B&W] provides a subsidy ($62,500)51 to Y's company:
part of these funds are passed to N for his political maneuvering
with the PM [Prime Minister] and key Diet members; the
remainder is used by Y in cultivating JTS officials. 52 For this, "N
will exert influence on the PM to pressure the JTS into acceding to
our marketing strategy., 53 The larger payoff to Yokoyama, via a
subsequent share in the increased revenues of B&W products in
Japan and becoming B&W's Japanese agent is also referenced.54
Again, Stein stressed the need for secrecy regarding Nakao:
about Sandefur's proposed visit, it seems likely that the visit was ultimately postponed or
cancelled. Similarly, nothing in the documents reveal whether Hughes' Japan visit was
carried out and so it seems unlikely that it was. Stein, Summary Report, supra note 27,
at -711.
47

Id.

48 Memorandum from Marvin H. Stein, Special Consultant, Brown & Williamson
Tobacco, to George E. Stungis, Dir. of Mkt. and Research Services, Brown &
Williamson
Tobacco
(Aug.
3,
1983),
Bates
No.
501024808/4810,
http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/ tid/upi23f0)0/pdf [hereinafter Stein, Briefing Notes].
49 Id. at -808. Absent corrupt payments, there would presumably be no illegality in
Hughes' lobbying or otherwise developing a personal relationship with Nakao. No other
activities appear in the memorandum. Id.
50 Id.

51 This value represents approximately $137,300 in 2008 U.S. dollars. U.S. Bureau
of
Labor
Statistics'
Consumer
Price
Index
Inflation
Calculator,
http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation-calculator.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2009).
52 Stein, Briefing Notes, supra note 48, at -808 to -09. Because JTS was a public
corporation, if Yokoyama was providing payments to JTS officials, his actions would
also have violated the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. See infra note 119 and
accompanying text.
53 Stein, Briefing Notes, supra note 48, at 809.
54 Id. Again, Nakao is not mentioned here and it is unclear whether he was to
receive a portion of this money, but it seems most likely that he would have. See supra
note 39.
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N wants his meetings with [B&W] to be completely
unpublicized. Since he is the PM's [Prime Minister's]
personal representative, he is constrained to stick to the
official state-to-state mission and his schedule is being
controlled by the Foreign Office and his movements are
monitored by its overseas embassies and consulates.55
Stein sent a confidential follow-up memo dated August 8,
1983, with a biographic summary of Nakao for Dr. Hughes as a
reminder of Nakao's extraordinary level of influence.56 Stein
emphatically specifies that Mr. Nakao had been "(a) Vice Minister
of Agriculture, (b) LDP Councillor on Agricultural Policy, (c)
Chairman of the LDP Standing Committee on Agriculture, [and]
(d) Chairman of the Lower House Committee on Liberalization of
Agricultural Imports, since 1982 (June), a post he now holds.""7
As Hughes would certainly have understood, these posts evidence
an extraordinary level of political clout.58
On August 16, 1983, just days before the meeting, Stein sent
an additional memo to Stungis, recommending that Hughes focus
on trade liberalization in his discussions with Nakao. Stein also
suggested that Hughes or Stungis provide a new benefit to Nakao,
by helping his son study in the United States: "Either IWH
[Hughes] or you should offer to help N's [college-age] son (who
will be traveling with him) study English in the US." 59 Again,
secrecy was critical: "I [Stein] should probably be the one to
handle it since [B&W] should have no known connection, in order
to insulate N.",60 Adjacent handwriting in Stungis' script notes
"Very important," and this note is linked to further notes below:
55 Stein, Briefing
56 Memorandum

Notes, supra note 48, at 809.
from Marvin H. Stein, Special Consultant, Brown & Williamson
Tobacco, to GES (Aug. 8, 1983), Bates No. 501024813, http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/
tid/ffu24f00/pdf [hereinafter Stein, Biographic Summary]. "GES" is George E. Stungis,
B&W's director of marketing research services. See infra note 26.
57 Stein, Biographic Summary, supra note 56. See also Stein, Summary Report,
supra note 27, at -712 (noting how Nakao had been able to cause a JTS chief to lose his
job).
58 See, e.g., CURTIS, supra note 7, at 88-98. It is also worth noting that Nakao's
support of B&W's interests essentially betrayed the domestic constituencies and
parliamentary colleagues for whom he publicly presented himself as an advocate.
59 Memorandum from Marvin H. Stein, Special Consultant, Brown & Williamson
Tobacco,
to
GES,
Bates
No.
501024680
(Aug.
16,
1983),
http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/cfu24f00/pdf [hereinafter Stein, Japan Update]. "GES"
is George E. Stungis, B&W's director of marketing research services. See infra note 26.
60 Id. (emphasis in original).
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"Non-open i> NO direct company connection" and "N would be
very beholding [sic]."'"
C. The Secret August 1983 Meeting andIts Aftermath
It is unclear precisely what transpired at the August 1983
meeting, as no written records are available. 62 Evidence in the
documentation suggests that Hughes and Nakao established an
ongoing working relationship of some kind, but the paper trail is
extremely limited. A February 17, 1984 letter from Yokoyama to
Stungis purports to convey a copy of a letter that was sent by
Nakao to Hughes on the previous day.63 However, Nakao's letter
is missing from Stungis' files; more intriguingly, the letter does
not appear anywhere else in B&W's document files, such as with
Dr. Hughes' materials, as would ordinarily be expected.64
Presumably, the letter was destroyed.
Ultimately, it seems that B&W's work with Nakao ended in
the spring of 1984 when Japan announced the liberalization of its
cigarette market.65 It seems likely that the February letter from
Nakao to Dr. Hughes pertained to Nakao's role in the Japanese
government's decision, but what was conveyed in that letter
Id.
According to Stungis' handwritten notes on the back of the August 16 memo,
Chairman Hughes received a one-hour briefing (from Stein and an unknown "AJ") on
the morning of August 20. Id. at -681; Handwritten notes, George E. Stungis, Dir. of
Mkt. and Research Services, Brown & Williamson Tobacco, Bates No. 501024681,
http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/dfu24f00/pdf [hereinafter Stungis, Notes]. However,
Hughes and Nakao's actual meeting appears to have been even more private. Stungis
wrote: "May want to leave AJ and Y downstairs." Id.
63 Letter from Kazuyuki Yokoyama, Pres., Great Asian Molub-Alloy, Ltd. to
Marvin H. Stein, Pres., Stein Assocs., Inc., Bates No. 501009269 (Feb. 17, 1984),
http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/ryu24f00/pdf.
64 Interestingly, Yokoyama's letter seems to have been secreted in Stungis' files,
archived in his "Spain" file, rather than the East Asia files. Given the hush that was
being put on Hughes' connections to Nakao and that the copies of Nakao's letter have
disappeared, it seems very plausible that there was an intentional effort to bury the letter
where it might not easily emerge during civil litigation discovery. See the metadata
availableat http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/ryu24f00 (listing the File Number as "Spain
Ital GES 840200").
65 Stein provided one final memo to Chairman Hughes via Stungis at the time of
the March 1984 public announcement by the Japanese government. Memorandum from
Marvin H. Stein, Special Consultant, Brown & Williamson Tobacco, to Dr. I.W. Hughes,
Chairman, Brown & Williamson Tobacco (Mar. 28, 1984), Bates No. 501009241,
http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/lwi23f0/pdf. Stein notes that Stungis had not received
Yokoyama's telephone call. However, once again pages may have disappeared or been
destroyed. Only a single page appears in the documents. It is unclear whether the memo
was just one page or whether pages behind the first page were removed. Stein's
signature does not appear at the bottom, as it had on most of his earlier memoranda.
61

62
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remains unknown.6 6

In light of the complete opening of the

tobacco market, B&W's need for a contemplated licensing
arrangement with JTS ended since it could instead compete
openly. 67 Thus, B&W opted to search for an independent venture
The company first
partner to build its Japanese market.
announced a joint venture with Meiji Seika, a major producer of
sweets and candies, 68 but this arrangement fell through when
tobacco control advocates in Japan protested the engagement of a
candy manufacturer as a toxic cigarette distributor. 69 A few weeks
later, the company announced a joint venture with Sumitomo
Corporation, the giant global trading company, as its partner in the
soon-to-be-open market.7" Thereafter, B&W quickly built its
Japanese market, becoming "the number two foreign cigarette
company in the country, thanks primarily to its Kent Mild brand"
by 1999."'
This limited documentation may be all that remains to
Three of the individuals directly
historicize these events.
involved, Hughes, Sandefur, and Stungis, have all passed away.72
Media reports in 2004 indicated Nakao to be in poor health, since
that was the basis for his avoiding prison time for an unrelated
bribery conviction.73 The trail completely disappears vis-A-vis
both Stein and Yokoyama after the February 1984 letter. So
perhaps only Joel Silverstein remains available to discuss these
matters, if he were willing.74
66 See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
67 See Whitehair, Visit Report, supra note 30 and accompanying text discussing

B&W's declining market share in Japan and need for aid from JTS.
68 B and W to Launch Tobacco Sales in Japan in Tie-Up with Meii Seika, Jin
PRESS TICKER SERV., Sept. 13, 1984, available at LEXIS.
69 Me~ii Seika Scraps Plan to Set Up Tobacco Sales Agent With U.S. Maker, JIJl
PRESS TICKER SERV., Oct. 19, 1984, available at LEXIS (noting that this was "mainly

because of opposition from anti-smoking groups"). This is all the more interesting
because Japan's tobacco control movement had only recently emerged at the time, and
one would not anticipate the activists' voices yet being influential. See, e.g., Eric A.
Feldman, The Limits of Tolerance: Cigarettes, Politics, and Society in Japan, in
CONFLICTS OVER TOBACCO POLICY AND PUBLIC HEALTH 38, 59 (Eric A.
Feldman & Ronald Bayer eds., 2004) (noting that most tobacco control organizations in
UNFILTERED:

Japan were formed after 1978).
70 Sumitomo to Sell B and W Cigarettes, JJI PRESS TICKER SERV., Nov. 16, 1984,
available at LEXIS.

71 Kilburn, Silverstein'sBook, supra note 29, at 20.
72 See infra notes 75-76 and note 79.
73 See infra note 89.
74 Such willingness seems unlikely. In a recent magazine interview, Silverstein
essentially covered up the fact that he had worked for a tobacco company. Maki
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Chairman Hughes' subsequent tenure as chairman of the
company was brief, as he passed away of an undisclosed illness in
March 1985. 75 Dr. Stungis appeared to have retired from B&W to
become CEO of a medical equipment company in Florida and just
recently passed away.76 Joel Silverstein remained as general
manager of B&W Japan at least until 1990, when he shifted to a
career in marketing other products, primarily Western fast foods,
as Vice President of Kentucky Fried Chicken in Japan, Vice
Chairman for DirectTV in Japan, and managing director for
Outback Steakhouse in Japan.77 He most recently moved to Hong
Kong to become manager of a chain of restaurants.78
Sandefur became B&W's chairman in 1993.79 He was among
the six tobacco industry company chairmen who famously testified
before a House subcommittee unanimously denying that nicotine
is addictive. 0 While Sandefur was never charged with perjury,
Committee Chair Henry Waxman accused Sandefur of having
"knowingly deceived" Congress.81 Stronger allegations were
raised by Dr. Jeffrey Wigand, who had worked directly with
Sandefur at B&W, on the CBS program 60 Minutes: "I believe he
[Sandefur] perjured himself because I watched those testimonies
Nibayashi, Life in Japan: Joel Silverstein, 338 TOKYO METROPOLIS, http://metropolis.co.
jp/lifeinjapan/338/lifeinjapaninc.htm. (last visited Feb. 5, 2009). Silverstein's reply
specifically lists several of his positions in Japan, but despite his ten years with B&W,
his longest career association, he mentions only having been "with a different company."
Id.
75 Ivor Wallace Hughes Dies; Headed Tobacco Company, N.Y. TIMES, March 25,
1985, at D 11. Hughes was 59 years old.
76 See SARASOTA HERALD-TRIBUNE (FLORIDA), Apr. 13, 2004, at B 1, available at
LEXIS (listing Dr. Stungis as a CEO of Medical Technology Corp.); SARASOTA HERALDTRIBUNE (FLORIDA), May 7, 2008, at B 10, availableat LEXIS.
77 Kilburn, supra note 29; Carla Rapoport, You Can Make Money in Japan,
FORTUNE, Feb. 12, 1990, at 85 (identifying Mr. Stein as the "general manager of Brown
& Williamson (Japan)"); People on the Move, NATION'S RESTAURANT NEWS, Jan. 4,
1999, at 87(l) ("Joel Silverstein joined Outback Steakhouse International L.P. as
managing director for Japan."); Nibayashi, supra note 74.
78 Linkedin.com, Joel Silverstein, http://www.linkedin.com/pub/7/449/5bb (last
visited Feb. 5, 2009) (listing current association with Vivaldi Foods in Hong Kong);
Focaccino Milano Coffee Bar & Bakery, http://www.focaccino.com (last visited Feb. 5,
2009) (Vivaldi Foods' restaurant in Hong Kong).
79 Glenn Collins, Thomas Sandefur, Tobacco Leader, Dies at 56, N.Y. TIMES, July
16, 1996, at BI8.
80 Id. Dr. Jeffrey Wigand has posted excerpts from the hearing transcript and a
video clip of this classic moment on his website, JeffreyWigand.com, Testimony of the 7
CEOs of Big Tobacco, http://www.jeffreywigand.com/7ceos.php (last visited Feb. 5,
2009). The transcript and broadcast shows Sandefur's verbatim testimony as "I believe
that nicotine is not addictive." Id.
81 Collins, supra note 79, at para. 7.
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very carefully.,1 2
Nakao continued his rise to power and influence in the
Japanese government, taking on the posts of Director of Japan's
Economic Planning Administration in the Takeshita cabinet,83
Minister of International Trade and Industry in the Kaifu
administration, 4 and Minister of Construction in the Hashimoto

administration." As Minister of Construction, however, things did
not bode well for Nakao. He was found to have accepted
approximately $600,000 in bribes from a construction company
while serving as cabinet minister.8 6 A major political scandal at

the time, Nakao was arrested on June 30, 2000, for receiving the
bribes, convicted in October 2002, and sentenced to pay $600,000
in fines and serve two years in prison.87 On November 21, 2003,
the Tokyo High Court upheld Nakao's conviction but modestly

reduced his sentence to acknowledge the former minister's
showing of "profound remorse." 8 On November 3, 2004, after the

Supreme Court had dismissed Nakao's appeal two months earlier,
the Tokyo High Public Prosecutors Office suspended Nakao's

sentence owing to an undisclosed illness, restoring the seventyfour year old disgraced politician's liberty. 9
television broadcast Feb. 4, 1996); see also
82 60 Minutes (CBS
JeffreyWigand.com, Jeffrey Wigand on 60 Minutes, February 4, 1996,
http://www.jeffreywigand.com/60minutes.php (last visited Feb. 5 2009) (broadcast
transcript). Sandefur's character (played by the actor Michael Graber) plays a major role
in the Academy Award nominated film "The Insider" that tells whistle-blower Wigand's
story, including his being personally hired and fired by Sandefur. THE INSIDER
(Touchstone Pictures 1999).
83 Takeshita Cabinet Completed, JulIPRESS TICKER SERV., Nov. 6, 1987, available
at LEXIS.
84 New Cabinet Lineup, JIJl
PRESS TICKER SERV., Jan. 4, 1991, available at LEXIS.
85 Hashimoto Cabinet Lineup, JI PREsS TICKER SERV., Jan. 11, 1996, available at
LEXIS.
86 Prosecutors Seek Prisonfor Nakao, JAPAN TIMES, May 31, 2002, available at

http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20020531a5.html; Nakao Gets Two-year Prison
Term, JAPAN TIMES, Oct. 17, 2002, available at http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgibin/nn20021017a3.html.
87 Id. It is somewhat rare for political officials' bribery cases in Japan to result in
actual prison time. See, e.g., Fukushima Ex-governor was Bribed, Gets to Walk, JAPAN
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgiTIMES,
Aug.
9,
2008,
available at
bin/nn20080809al.html. Nakao's heavier sentence presumably reflects the public and
the court's particular disapproval of the scale of the bribery and that he had misused a
cabinet-level position.
88 'Remorseful' Nakao's Bribery Sentence Cut by Two Months, JAPAN TIMES, Nov.
22, 2003, availableat http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20031122a8.html.
89 Nakao's Prison Term Suspended Due to Sickness, JAPAN TIMES, Nov. 3, 2004,
availableat http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20041103a8.html.
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B&W has also exited the stage. In October 2003, BritishAmerican Tobacco sold B&W to its former competitor, R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco, for $2.6 billion. 90 Nonetheless, B&W's
brands, including Kent, 9' are still being smoked by millions.92
93
III. Catch Me If You Can

A. An Explanation of the Foreign CorruptPracticesAct
Because countless pages have already been written on the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), this article provides only a
brief historical introduction and explanation of the law.94 The
history of the Act is the most significant matter here since B&W's
plans evidenced in the documents are especially interesting when
one considers that the contemplated activity seems to be precisely
what the law was intended to prevent.
As noted above, the origins of the FCPA lay in the
prosecutorial and congressional investigations following the
Watergate scandal during the Nixon administration.95 These
investigations and the convictions which resulted revealed such
substantial illegal political contributions to the 1972 Nixon
reelection campaign by American corporations that the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) began an
investigation into all possible misuses of corporate funds and
90 Tony Mecia & Stella M. Hopkins, R.J.R. Tobacco to Buy a Rival, CHARLOTTE
OBSERVER, Oct. 28, 2003, at D1.

91 Kent cigarettes represent an infamous legacy given to Herbert A. Kent upon his
retirement from the presidency of Lorillard Tobacco Company in March 1952. It was
also the product that put asbestos, "a pure, dust-free, completely harmless material" into
cigarette filters for what was advertised as "The Greatest Health Protection in Cigarette
History". RICHARD KLUGER, ASHES TO ASHES: AMERICA'S HUNDRED-YEAR CIGARETTE

WAR, THE PUBLIC HEALTH, AND THE UNABASHED TRIUMPH OF PHILIP MORRIS 151 (1996).
92 According to the Tobacco Industry of Japan's latest reports, Kent is the second
best-selling import cigarette in Japan. The brand sold 52 million packs in the first
quarter of 2008, representing 1.6% of total market share. Tobacco Institute of Japan,
http://www.tioj.or.jp/info/f4_29.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2009).
93 CATCH ME IF YOU CAN (DreamWorks, 2002).

94 Westlaw's FCPA Reporter Bibliography lists two loose-leaf reporters, twentyseven monographs, and several hundred theses and journal articles from 1976 through
April 2008. 3 FOR. CORRUPT PRAC. A. REP. (West) Bibliography (2008). See generally
GEORGE C. GREANIAS & DUANE WINDSOR, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT:

ANATOMY OF A STATUTE (1982) (providing an early and opinionated report with
extensive historical material); STUART H. DEMING, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES
ACT AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL NORMS (2005) (providing an updated presentation of

the FCPA and more recent developments of related international standards).
95 GREANIAS & WINDSOR, supra note 94, at 17.
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concealment of improper payments. 96 By December 31, 1976, the
SEC reported seventy-seven firms that were suspected of
questionable or clearly illegal foreign political and commercial
payments, "ranging from $13,349 (Smith International) to
$56,771,000 (Exxon)."9 7 Congress leapt into action with regard to

these issues, but it was not until the Carter administration replaced
the Ford administration in January 1977 that legislation could be
enacted and signed. During the Ford years, there seemed to be a
consensus that some measures were necessary, but debate in
Congress raged over the most appropriate approach-whether it
should be a disclosure approach or a criminalized approach-but
eventually, criminal penalties were included. 98
Nonetheless, by the time the law was enacted, the government
had made clear that national foreign policy interests were at stake
in preventing corrupt activities by American companies abroad.
W. Michael Blumenthal, President Carter's Treasury Secretary,
explicitly made this point in his testimony before Congress:
We agree that the United States should impose criminal
penalties on American businesses and their officials who
bribe foreign public officials .... Apart from the moral

repugnance and the inefficiency of the system, bribery is
contrary to the foreign policy interests of the United States.
There is ample evidence to support the statement that
overseas bribery creates strains in our relations with
friendly foreign countries and causes the international
investment climate to deteriorate. 99
As to the law's substance, for purposes of analysis, the multilayered and complex language of the FCPA's anti-bribery
provisions can be conveniently broken down into seven key
elements: '
A violation of the Act's anti-bribery provisions occurs if:
96 Id. at 19.
97 Id. at 22.

Three of the nine leading companies in the U.S. tobacco industry
reported questionable payments. Id. at 24, table 2-3.
98 Id. at 49-68.
99 Id. at 71 (quoting W. Michael Blumenthal's remarks at the hearing on H.R.
3815). Greanias and Windsor further note that "the final debates on the floors of the
Senate and House underscored again the foreign-policy implications of the act." Id.
100 Christopher J. Duncan, The 1998 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendments:
Moral Empiricism or Moral Imperialism?, 1 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POLCY J. 16, 22-24 (2000)
(listing nine elements regarding the post-1998 statute, upon which these seven elements
are based).
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(1) an issuer or domestic concern;
(2) corruptly;
(3) uses the mails or any other means or instrumentality of

interstate commerce, in furtherance of,
(4) a payment, offer, promise to pay, or authorization of a
payment, promise or offer of money or anything of value;
(5) to (a) any foreign official, (b) any foreign political party or
party official, (c) candidate for foreign political office, or (d) any
person while "knowing or having reason to know" that the
payment or promise to pay will be passed on to one of the above;
(6) for the purposes of (a) influencing an official act or
decision of that person or, (b) inducing that person to use his
influence with the government or instrumentality to affect or

influence any act or decision;
(7) to obtain or retain business, or direct business to any
person.' 0 1
These elements enable us to clarify the contours of FCPA
violations evidenced by the Brown and Williamson documents.
101 Id. The relevant statutory language as enacted is as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any domestic concern, other than an issuer
which is subject to section 78dd-1 of this title, or for any officer,
director, employee, or agent of such domestic concern.., to make use
of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce
corruptly in furtherance of any offer, payment, promise to pay, or
authorization of the payment of any money, or offer, gift, promise to
give, or authorization of the giving of anything of value to-(1) any foreign official for purposes of-(A) influencing any act or decision of such foreign official in his official
capacity ... ; or
(B) inducing such foreign official to use his influence with a foreign
government or instrumentality thereof to affect or influence any act or
decision of such government or instrumentality,
in order to assist such domestic concern in obtaining or retaining
business for or with, or directing business to, any person;...
(3) any person, while knowing or having reason to know that all or a
portion of such money or thing of value will be offered, given, or
promised, directly or indirectly, to any foreign official..., for purposes
of-(A) influencing any act or decision of such foreign official, political
party, or candidate in his or its official capacity ... ; or
(B) inducing such foreign official, political party, party official, or
candidate to use his or its influence with a foreign government or
instrumentality thereof to affect or influence any act or decision of such
government or instrumentality, in order to assist such domestic concern
in obtaining or retaining business for or with, or directing business to,
any person.
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2 (1983).
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B. The Illegality ofB& W's PurportedPayments to Nakao
and Yokoyama
This section draws upon the documentary record in reviewing
the intended gifts and payments to Yokoyama and Nakao.
Through this analysis, it becomes immanently clear that B&W's
planned program for working with Yokoyama and Nakao, if it was
carried out, represented illegal conduct by B&W, Hughes, Stungis,
and Stein" 2 in several regards.
1. Nakao and Yokoyama's Assistance PresumedLegal
First, since it was provided gratis and with no apparent quid
pro quo, Nakao's and Yokoyama's assistance during the March
1983 trip was presumably legal. As noted above, Stein's March
1983 memo specifically detailed several ways that Nakao
exercised his political influence to assist B&W officials during
their Tokyo trip. 103 This influence included Nakao's making
possible meetings with some of the most powerful bureaucrats in
the Japanese government as well as being a factor 10in4 senior JTS
officials' cooperative manner with the B&W visitors.
While Nakao's efforts may well have been intended as an
inducement to lure B&W's willingness to provide payments later,
the Stein memo makes clear that there was no "offer, payment,
promise to pay, or authorization of the payment of any money...
or value"10 5 to either Nakao or Yokoyama at that time. 0 6 Stein
notes as to Nakao: "Mr. N later told Mr. Y that he made these
arrangements strictly as a favor to me in light of our long-standing

102 Yokoyama's terms of engagement and actions while in the territory of the United
States would indicate a basis for his FCPA liability under the current version of the
FCPA. But because the law's application to non-U.S. affiliated persons only came into
effect with the 1998 revisions, Yokoyama could not have been cited under the FCPA in
effect in 1983. See International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, 15
U.S.C. § 78dd-3 (1998) (governing persons other than issuers or domestic concerns).
His engagement may well have been illegal under Japanese law, but that is a separate
matter.
103 Stein, Summary Report, supra note 27.
104 Id. at 713.
105 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2 (2000).
106 Stein, Summary Report, supra note 27.
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friendship."' 7 Stein notes as to Yokoyama: "His invaluable
advice and assistance to date has been rendered free of charge
because of our long-standing personal relationship."'0 8
Accordingly, this memo sets the framework for the plans that
followed but does not document or suggest any FCPA violations
during the March trip.
2. The $62,500 Subsidy Violated the FCPA
The contemplated $62,500 "subsidy" to Yokoyama, if paid as
suggested by the documents, would likely have represented at least
two separate FCPA violations by B&W, as well as by Hughes,
Stungis, and Stein as individuals - first as to Nakao's exercise of
influence and second as to Yokoyama's "cultivating .

.

. favor"

with JTS officials.
The following analysis draws upon the seven-item list of the
FCPA's anti-bribery provisions, as set forth in Section III of this
article.
(1) An issuer or domestic concern;
FCPA § 78dd-2's restrictions apply to "any domestic concern,
other than an issuer which is subject to section 78dd- 1 of this title,
director, employee, or agent of such domestic
or any officer,
9
concern."'

10

The FCPA defines a "domestic concern" as:
(A) any individual who is a citizen, national, or resident of
the United States; or (B) any corporation, partnership,
trust,
company, business
association, joint-stock
which
or
sole
proprietorship
organization,
unincorporated
has its principal place of business in the United States, or
which is organized under the laws of a State of the United
States or a territory, possession, or commonwealth of the
United States." 0
In 1983, B&W was a wholly-owned subsidiary of BATCO, the
107 Id.at 712.

108 Id. Later in another document, Stein provides more detail: "NAKAO and
YOKOYAMA are long-time, close friends dating back to NAKAO's student days at
Waseda University, plus their mutual involvement in student and youth affairs. This
writer (Marvin Stein) has known both for more than 25 years and also knew Mr.
YOKOYAMA's father before that." Stein, Briefing Notes, supra note 48, at -808 (all
caps in original).
109 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a) (1983).
110 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(1) (1983).
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U.S.-operating entity for British American Tobacco, with its
principal place of business in Louisville, Kentucky."'
Accordingly, B&W was a "domestic concern" for FCPA § 78dd-2
purposes.' 12 Since Hughes was one of its officers (and presumably
a director), Stungis was an employee, and Stein was an agent of
the concern, the FCPA's restrictions also applied to Hughes,
Stungis, and Stein individually.
(2) corruptly,
The statute itself does not define the notion of "corruptly," but
which Duncan
a clear statement is given in the legislative history,
13
connotations:'
moral
implies
out,
has pointed
The word "corruptly" is used in order to make clear that the
offer, payment, promise, or gift, must be intended to induce
the recipient to misuse his official position in order to
wrongfully direct business to the payer or his client, or to
obtain preferential legislation or a favorable regulation. The
word "corruptly" connotes an evil motive or purpose, an
intent to wrongfully influence the recipient.'
Stein's memos repeatedly and emphatically convey to all
involved parties the sensitivity associated with Nakao's
engagement. Such sensitivity implicates in the circumstances 1 5 a
wrongful use of Nakao's influence, power, and authority, which, if
publicly exposed, would have been castigated or punished. For
example, Stein makes clear that Nakao's "independent image...
as totally separate and apart from business involvement must be
maintained and protected at all costs.""' 6 Nakao wanted "his
meetings with [B&W] to be completely unpublicized" and did not
want his Japanese government handlers to know of the August

III In fact, Hughes was himself a former BAT executive sent over from the U.K. for
his B&W posting. Ivor Wallace Hughes Dies, supra note 75.
112 FCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2 (1983). As a wholly owned subsidiary of BATCO,
B&W was not an "issuer," which is defined in 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (1983).
113 Duncan, supra note 100, at 31-32 (arguing that the statute fails in part owing to
the variations in how morality is assessed in different cultures).
114 Id. at 32 n.190 (citing Foreign Corrupt Practices and Domestic and Foreign
Investment Disclosure Act of 1977, S.REP. NO. 95-114 (1977), reprinted in 1977
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098, 4108).
115 Secrecy of an activity should not per se indicate corruption. But in the context of
activity that is arguably unethical, such as payments to a public official, secrecy strongly
suggests a misuse of an official position. Transparency will generally be welcome for
proper payments.
116 Stein, Summary Report, supra note 27, at -712 (emphasis added).
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meeting." 7 And, as noted above, Nakao's support of B&W in
liberalizing Japan's tobacco market was directly opposed to his
public and pre-eminent political representation as a defender of
Japanese agricultural interests.' 18
The corrupt nature of Yokoyama's use of funds "in cultivating
JTS officials""' 9 is arguably less evident. One would certainly
wish to inquire how the funds were to be used to cultivate the
officials' favor, but given the amount of money involved, it seems
most likely that personal payments and gifts of value were
intended means for bringing JTS officials into B&W's good favor.
Since these would have involved the JTS public officials' illicit
acceptance of private personal benefits, the corrupt element of the
intent is strongly suggested by the planned allocation of funds. 2 °
(3) uses the mails or any other means or instrumentalityof
interstatecommerce, in furtheranceof;
B&W and the involved individuals all used the mails and other
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce in furtherance of
the plan.
"Interstate commerce" is defined in the FCPA as: "trade,
commerce, transportation, or communication among the several
States, or between any foreign country and any State or between
any State and any place or ship outside thereof, and such term
includes the intrastate use of (A) a telephone or other interstate
means of communication, or (B) any other interstate
instrumentality." 2 '
This element seems quite obviously established. At the very
least, all of the individuals involved except Stein traveled via some
interstate instrumentality from Louisville and Tokyo to New York
for the meeting in August.'22 Moreover, all of Stein's memos
presumably moved interstate from his office in New York City to
117 Stein, Briefing Notes, supra note 48, at -808-09.
This manner is also
dramatically illustrated by Stungis' handwritten notes on the August 16, 1983 memo,
indicating: "Non-open k5 NO direct company connection". Stein, Japan Update, supra
note 59, at 680.
118 See Stein, Briefing Notes, supra note 48; Stein, Summary Report, supra note 27.
119 Stein, Briefing Notes, supra note 48, at 809.
120 For a related discussion regarding "knowing," see also infra notes 125-127.
121

15 U.S.C. § 78dd-378d(3) (1983).

122 See Stein, Briefing Notes, supra note 48; Stein, Biographic Summary, supra note

57; Stein, Japan Update, supra note 59. Of course, Stein traveled interstate in going
from New York to Tokyo in March. See Stein, Summary Report, supra note 27.
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B&W headquarters in Louisville, Kentucky by postal mail. 23 All
of these actions were in furtherance of the planned political
bribery.
(4) a payment, offer, promise to pay, or authorizationof
payment,promise or offer of money or anything of value;
This element also seems quite obviously established as the
plan unmistakably contemplated a payment, promise to pay, an
authorization of a payment, promise, or offer of money or
something of value.
Stein's August 3, 1983 memo expressly contemplates a cash
payment of an unspecified amount to Nakao, from the $62,500
cash paid to Yokoyama."' Similarly, as noted above, the plan
apparently contemplates payments of money or other value to JTS
officials, although these payments are not precisely detailed.
(5) to (a) any foreign official, (b) any foreign politicalparty or
party official, (c) candidatefor foreign political office, or (d) any
person while "knowing or having reason to know" that the
payment or promise to pay will be passedon to one of the above;
The intended payments were both to a foreign official, as
barred by subsection (a), and to a person "knowing or having
reason to know" that the payment would be passed to a foreign
official, as barred by subsection (d).
The FCPA defines a "foreign official" as:
any officer or employee of a foreign government or any
department, agency, or instrumentality thereof, or any
person acting in an official capacity for or on behalf of any
such government or department. agency, or instrumentality.
Such term does not include any employee of a foreign
government or any department, agency, or instrumentality
thereof whose duties are essentially ministerial or
clerical. 25
123 Office "fax" machines were becoming common in Japan in 1983, but they did
not become ubiquitous in the United States until three or four years later. Marian Beise,
Lead Markets: Country-Specific Drivers of the GlobalDiffusion of Innovations, 33 RES.
POL'Y 997, 997 (2004). Moreover, none of the documents have any indicator markings
such as fax transmission headers or footers, which are visible in many tobacco industry
documents beginning from the late 1980s.
124 Stein, Briefing Notes, supra note 48, at 808-09.
125 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-278d(2) (1983). The 1998
amendments expanded the scope of the statute to include those employed by "public
international organizations" and provide a separate definition of that term. International
Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 to -3 (1999). The
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As to Nakao, no complicated analysis is needed; he was,
without a doubt, a foreign official. He was a powerful elected
legislator who had already served as a cabinet vice-minister of the
pertinent executive agency.1 26 His work was in no regard
ministerial or clerical.
As to Yokoyama's involvement with JTS officials, the indirect
payment brings the more complicated "knowing or reason to
know" language into purview. It has already been acknowledged
that the documentation is ambiguous whether cash payments or
other value would be passed to JTS officials. Assuming arguendo
that element was met, Stein's documentation read by B&W
officials is utterly clear that this would go to foreign officials at
JTS, at least sufficient for the "knowing" requirement, and if not,
then with a "reason to know."' 27
In a recent commentary, Justin Marceau provides a helpful
approach for considering "complicated arrangements with
consultants":
The line separating legal and legitimate consulting
agreements from mere conduits of bribery can be sketched
out using details of the Justice Department's own
aggressive pursuit of FCPA prosecutions, as well as
elements of emerging and increasingly complex consulting
agreements. Certainfactors, such as the reputation of the
agent, the agent's compensation, and any suspicious
accommodation requests, are relevant when determining
whether a domestic company's decision to hire a particular
agent will trigger FCPA liability. If the consultants hired
have a reputation for bribing officials, or other corrupt

exception for "ministerial or clerical" actions had been removed from the definition to a
separate exception for "routine governmental action" in the 1988 amendments. Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act Amendments of 1988, 102 Stat. 1107, 1416 (1988).
126 Stein, Biographic Summary, supra note 57, at 813.
127 The "reason to know" language was removed from the FCPA in the 1988
amendments. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendments of 1988, 102 Stat. 1107, 1416
(1988). However, interpretations of the "knowing" term have been broad enough to
approach the former "reason to know" standard such that B&W officials seemed to have
been in the red zone even under a the requirement for the scienter of "knowingly." See
Julia Christine Bliss & Gregory J. Spak, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1988:
Clarificationor Evisceration?,20 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 441,458-63 (1988) "As for the
deliberate ignorance or 'head in the sand' problem, the conferees adopted the reasoning
of the federal courts in a number of cases involving possession of narcotics or the receipt
of stolen property which concluded that the term 'knowingly' already encompasses the
problem of deliberate ignorance." Id. at 463.
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28

behavior, a presumption of knowing impropriety exists. 1
Following from this reasoning, even if B&W officials might
not have known precisely how Yokoyama would be spending the
money on JTS officials, his unquestionably corrupt engagement
with Nakao reveals a "reputation" for bribing officials that would
have been understood by B&W executives or representatives.
Thus, even while further investigation would be warranted to
understand better the planned interactions with JTS officials, the
knowing element could be presumed from the documented
circumstances.
Also for FCPA purposes, it is inconsequential that JTS was
essentially a commercial enterprise: "The FCPA does not
distinguish between government officials acting in a sovereign
capacity and a government agency acting in a commercial
capacity. Accordingly, 'virtually any transaction between a person
subject to the FCPA and the employees of a state-owned entity...
can raise FCPA issues.""' 29 As noted above, 30 JTS was a whollyowned state enterprise in 1983 and so its officials were clearly
"government officials" under 15 U.S.C. § 78d(2).
(6)for the purposes of (a) influencing an official act or
decision of that person or, (b) inducing that person to use his
influence with the government or instrumentality to affect or
influence any act or decision;
The described payments were clearly for the purpose of
influencing official acts and decisions and inducing persons to use
their influence. B&W was aiming for two key targets in Japanese
governmental policy-liberalization of the tobacco market for
foreign manufacturers,13 1 and, in the interim, an inside deal with
128 Justin F. Marceau, A Little Less Conversation, A Little More Action: Evaluating
and Forecasting the Trend of More Frequent and Severe Prosecutions Under the
Foreign CorruptPractices Act, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 285, 306 (citing DONALD
R. CRUVER, COMPLYING WITH THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 47-48 (1999))
(emphasis added). Marceau adds: "[When] the "consultant" is in a corrupt relationship
with the foreign official, . . . a company ... will be well served by an early guilty plea."
Id. at 307.
129 Id. at 306 n.91 (citing Foreign Corrupt Practices Act v. 1, 106.003 (2005)).

Perhaps the most famous early cases in this regard were the so-called Pemex cases
involving Petr6leos Mexicanos (Pemex), a national oil company owned by the Republic

of Mexico. For a concise synopsis of the four cases in this series, see Robert S.Levy,
The Antibribery Provisions of the FCPA of 1977: Are they Really as Valuable as We
Think They Are?, 10 DEL. J. CORP. L. 71, 91-92 (1985).
130 Levin, supra note 19.
131 See, e.g., Kraar, supra note 29; Presentation by Pat Sheehy, supra note 35; see
also Alan Murray, Smoke in the Eyes of JTS: U.S. CigaretteMakers Join Forces to Open
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JTS regarding distribution of B&W's Kent brand cigarettes.' 32
There is nothing subtle in the Stein memoranda about Nakao
and Yokoyama's roles. Their roles involved inducing Japanese
government officials, including the Prime Minister and the senior
officials at JTS, to take official actions and make official decisions
in B&W's interest, and to have Nakao exercise his own political
authority as a leading and powerful politician in B&W's
commercial interest.
For example:
As Nakao 's access to the Prime Minister. "N will exert
influence on the PM to pressure the JTS into acceding to our
33
marketing strategy.'
As to Nakao 's access to other politicians: "NAKAO [is] ...
one of the most influential members of the 150-man agricultural
bloc in the Diet (Parliament)"' 34 "Part of these funds are passed to
N for his political maneuvering with the PM and key Diet
members."' 35
As to Nakao's own acts and decisions: "Mr. N has been...
Chairman of the Lower House Committee on Liberalization of
Agricultural Imports, since 1982 (June), a post he now holds.' 36
As to the overall JTS scheme: "This duo is capable of
influencing the JTS to accept a licensing and marketing formula
strongly favored by [B&W]/Japan ....
,
And as to Yokoyama's inducing JTS officials decisions
favoring B& W. "the remainder [of the $62,500 "subsidy"] is used
by Y in cultivating JTS officials.' 38
(7) to obtain or retain business, or direct business to any
person.

Market, JAPAN ECON. J., Mar. 9, 1982, at 15 (establishment of U.S. Tobacco Exporters
Association); Letter from U.S. Tobacco Exporters Association to Japan Tobacco & Salt
Public Corporation (July 5, 1983), http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/arw91d00/pdf. (last
visited Feb. 5,2009)
132 Stein, Summary Report, supra note 27; see also Whitehair Report, Oct. 23, 1981,
supra note 30 (indicating B&W's frustration with JTS that it was trying to alleviate and
Kent market share concerns).
133 Stein, Briefing Notes, supra note 48, at -809.
134 Stein, Summary Report, supra note 27, at -711.
135 Stein, Briefing Notes, supra note 48, at -808-09.
136 Stein, Biographic Summary, supra note 57, at -813.
137 Stein, Summary Report, supra note 27, at -711.
138 Stein, Briefing Notes, supra note 48, at -809.
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This element is entirely self-evident as to the effort to obtain a
licensing agreement with JTS for the Kent brand, since the
payments were precisely in order to obtain a favorable government
contract with JTS. Or as Stein's March memo makes clear from
the start, the purposes of the scheme is for "substantial [sic]
enhancing B&W revenues in Japan."' 3 9
B&W's efforts towards opening the Japanese cigarette market
were also generally for the purpose of obtaining business in Japan,
in that expanded market access would indirectly (but hugely)
advance B&W's unmistakable commercial goal of selling
cigarettes in Japan.140
3. Yokoyama's Licensing Royalty Possibly Violated the
FCPA
The contemplated licensing royalty to Yokoyama may also
have been a violation of the FCPA. However, for the royalty to
constitute a violation, prosecutors would have to prove that those
individuals involved in making the arrangement had actual
knowledge or reason to know that all or a portion of such royalty
would be offered, given, or promised, directly or indirectly, to
Nakao for his engaging his political influence. Such knowledge
seems very plausible but is only conjectural.
(1) An issuer, domestic concern, or any person other than an
issuer or domestic concern;
B&W was a "domestic concern." Hughes was one of its
officers (and presumably a director), Stungis was an employee,
and Stein was an agent of the concern. 4 '
(2) corruptly;
The corrupt nature of any portion of the royalty payments
provided to Nakao for his engaging his political influence would
142
be evident for the reasons discussed above.
(3) uses the mails or any other means or instrumentalityof
interstate commerce, in furtherance of;
139 Stein, Summary Report, supra note 27, at -711.
140 Cf U.S. v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738, 748 (2004) (upholding a broad interpretation of

the FCPA's phrasing "obtaining or retaining business" "beyond the narrow band of
payments sufficient only to 'obtain or retain government contracts'

intended to affect a foreign Haitian tax policy).
141 See supra notes 109-112 and accompanying text.
142 See supra notes 113-120 and accompanying text.
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Again, B&W and the involved individuals all used the mails
and other means or instrumentalities of interstate commerce in
furtherance of the plan.143
(4) a payment, offer, promise to pay, or authorizationof a
payment, promise or offer of money or anything of value;
This element constitutes the crux of the issue regarding the
proposed royalty payments. While the proposed royalty payments
would likely have been several magnitudes more valuable than the
$62,500 "subsidy,"' 144 the documents do not expressly indicate that
any portion of the royalty payments were to be provided to Nakao.
But this conclusion seems fairly implied from the circumstances.
The documents indicated the royalties paid to Yokoyama would be
145
Moreover, as noted above, 146
for the success of "the Y-N duo.'
the value of Nakao's service in the arrangement was far greater
than Yokoyama's. Thus, it seems highly likely that Nakao should
have shared in this far larger payoff. Had the documents emerged
in a more timely fashion, the payments would have been a key
area for further exploration by investigators.
Also, as noted above, it seems that the proposed JTS/Kent
licensing scheme was never concluded, since B&W was able to
sell its products directly in Japan without partnering with JTS after
the liberalization of Japan's cigarette market. However, this does
not necessarily eliminate B&W's FCPA liability exposure
regarding the royalty scheme. The statute is entirely clear that the
conclusion of an illicit arrangement is not prerequisite to
liability. 47 Rather, the law is violated even when a domestic
concern makes an offer, promise to pay, or authorizes a promise or
offer. Thus, if B&W officials 148 offered the royalty scheme to
See supra notes 121-123 and accompanying text.
Keep in mind, however, that Stein's March 25 memo proposed a fifty percent
share of the Kent royalties to Yokoyama. Stein, Summary Report, supra note 27, at
-712. Given the size of the anticipated Kent market in Japan, this promise would have
been worth millions or perhaps billions of dollars.
145 Id. "If the Y-N duo succeed in the BWT strategy with JTS, Y would expect to
receive about one-half of the royalties on Kent to be licensed by JTS." Id.
146 Id. See also supra text accompanying note 39.
147 See FCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2 (1983).
148 It also seems possible that Stein submitted the royalty offer to Yokoyama
(knowing that a portion would go to Nakao) on behalf of B&W, in advance of the
August 20, 1983 meeting. Such action would have been illegal, but this possibility poses
yet another level of complexity regarding B&W, Hughes, or Stungis with regards to
whether they knew Stein would have done so.
143

144
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Yokoyama, knowing a portion was reserved for Nakao's reward,
the ultimate cancellation of the scheme would not provide them
with a legal defense.
The paper trail should have provided a foundation for further
inquiry regarding any August 20, 1983 discussion of Kent
licensing royalties to Yokoyama. Prosecutors might well have
obtained testimony regarding the arrangements conveyed in the
August 20, 1983 meeting sufficient to establish an offer or
promise to reward Nakao from the royalties or to pay Yokoyama
knowing that he was to be passing money from the royalties on to
Nakao. But with the protagonists essentially no longer available,
the paper case seems insufficient regarding the royalty scheme.
Nakao's name is not explicitly linked to the proposed royalties in
any documents discovered to date and the connection remains very
plausible but still only conjectural.
(5) to (a) any foreign official, (b) any foreign politicalparty or
party official, (c) candidatefor foreign political office, or (d) any
person while "knowing or having reason to know" that the
payment or promise to pay will be passed on to one of the above;
Again, Nakao was a foreign official.
Thus, if the August
meeting included an offer to Nakao regarding the royalties under
(a), or an offer to Yokoyama knowing a portion would go to
Nakao under (d), there would have been an FCPA violation,
regardless of whether the plan contemplated the royalty payments
being channeled through Yokoyama.
(6)for the purposes of (a) influencing an official act or
decision of that person or, (b) inducing that person to use his
influence with the government or instrumentality to affect or
influence any act or decision;
The analysis and result here are the same as above with
regards to the $62,500 "subsidy."14 9
(7)to obtain or retain business, or direct business to any
person.
The analysis and result here150 are the same as above with
regards to the $62,500 "subsidy.,

149
150

See supra notes 131-138 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 139-140 and accompanying text.
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4. EducationalAssistancefor Nakao's Son May Have
Violated the FCPA
Finally, the contemplated educational assistance for Nakao's
college-age son, if provided as suggested by the documents, may
have also represented FCPA violations by B&W, Hughes, Stungis,
and Stein, though the possibility of violation substantially depends
on the type of assistance contemplated.
(1) An issuer, domestic concern, or any person other than an
issuer or domestic concern;
B&W was a "domestic concern," Hughes was one of its
officers (and presumably a director), Stungis was an employee,
and Stein was an agent of the concern. 51
(2) corruptly;
The corrupt nature of a benefit provided to Nakao's son to
purchase Nakao's political influence would be evident for the
same reasons as discussed above. 52 The fact that the proposed
assistance was so obviously personal adds emphasis to such a
conclusion. Similarly, Stein's suggestion that he "should probably
be the one to handle it since B&W should have no known
connection, in order to insulate N" and the adjacent handwriting in
Stungis' script noting "Very important" and "Non-open /> NO
direct company connection" and "N would be very beholding
[sic]" provide further support towards reaching the same
conclusion.153
(3) uses the mails or any other means or instrumentality of
interstatecommerce, in furtheranceof;
B&W and the involved individuals all used the mails and other
means or instrumentalities of interstate commerce in furtherance
of the plan.
(4) a payment, offer, promise to pay, or authorization of a
payment,promise or offer of money or anythingof value;
B&W's contemplated offer to help Nakao's college-age son
study in the United States could be viewed within the FCPA as
"anything of value." The weakness in this argument lies in the
uncertainty as to the nature of any contemplated or offered
assistance. The pre-1987 FCPA had no de minimus exception, but
151
152
153

See supra notes 109-112 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 113-120 and accompanying text.
Stein, Japan Update, supra note 59, at -680.
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if the contemplated assistance was merely a courteous welcome or
simple gesture of hospitality, B&W's offer would not have
warranted FCPA prosecution.154 If the contemplated assistance
was genuinely "of value," such as helping Nakao's son gain
admission to a competitive program, providing a scholarship, or
helping with the young man's living expenses, then such an offer
would surely have been illegal.
Thus, the paper trail should have provided a foundation for
further inquiry regarding any August 20, 1983 discussion of
assistance to Nakao's college-age son traveling with him.
Prosecutors may have been able to obtain testimony regarding the
arrangements conveyed in the August 20, 1983 meeting sufficient
to establish the existence of an offer of assistance that was "of
value" to Nakao. But with the protagonists essentially no longer
available, the paper case is ambiguous at best.
Regarding the royalty scheme, the statute is clear that the
conclusion of an illicit arrangement is not prerequisite to
liability.' 55 Rather, the law is violated when a domestic concern
merely makes an offer, promise to pay, or authorizes a promise or
offer.' 56 Thus, if B&W officials offered to assist Nakao's son in a
manner that was valuable at the August 20, 1983 meeting, it is
irrelevant whether the assistance was actually provided.
(5) to (a) any foreign official, (b) any foreign politicalparty or
party official, (c) candidatefor foreign political office, or (d) any
person while "knowing or having reason to know" that the
payment orpromise to pay will be passedon to one of the above;
Nakao was a foreign official, 57and this contemplated offer was
to be transmitted directly to him. 1
(6)for the purposes of (a) influencing an official act or
decision of that person or, (b) inducing that person to use his
influence with the government or instrumentality to affect or
influence any act or decision;
The analysis and result here are the same as above with

154 Nonetheless, the obviously private nature of the benefit being considered for
Nakao's son adds support to characterizing the other components and the entirety of the
proposed scheme as "corrupt."
155 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2 (1983).
156 Id.
157 See supra text accompanying note 125.
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regards to the $62,000 "subsidy." '
(7) to obtain or retain business, or direct business to any
person.
The analysis and result here are the same as above with
regards to the $62,500 "subsidy."' 5 9
Thus, analysis based upon the FCPA in effect at the time
strongly suggests the illegality of B&W's planned program.
Though these historic events can no longer serve as the basis for
criminal liability, the next section of this article evidences how
this recent story nonetheless identifies compelling and urgent
considerations for policy makers today.
IV. Live and Let Die

160

The limited set of available documents reveals a picture of
carefully drafted plans for commerce and corrupt political
influence. Again, it is presently impossible to determine whether
the planned offers were in fact made, whether the contemplated
$62,500 payment was given to Yokoyama, or what support, if any,
Nakao's son received from B&W (via Stein) for college study in
the United States. Also, it appears that the grand ideas Stein
developed for a JTS/Kent licensing scheme that would deliver
sizable rewards to its facilitator or possible facilitators never came
to pass.
At the very least, it seems that B&W's officials and agents,
including the company Chairman himself, quite knowingly and
intentionally waded into murky waters, holding hands with corrupt
Japanese players. Perhaps they decided not to dive in and swim
out to deeper water together, but if offers were made, or cash or
other value conveyed to tap into Nakao's substantial influence
with Japan's Prime Minister Nakasone, with other members of
parliament, into its ministries, or with the public officials who ran
the Japanese government's tobacco monopoly, then under the
FCPA, B&W and the individuals involved committed crimes
under U.S. law even without taking the plunge.
The documented circumstances offer a glimpse of events that
158
159

See supra text accompanying notes 117-123.
See supra text accompanying notes 124-125.

160 LIVE AND LET DIE (United Artists 1973).
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warrant further attention and exposure.
A. A CallforA ProperInvestigation into U.S. Tobacco
Industry Dirty Dealings andAppropriateLegislative or
Regulatory Action.
At the time of this writing, the U.S. Congress is considering a
major enactment 6 ' that would grant explicit regulatory authority
to the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (F.D.A.) over tobacco
products.' 62 The bill has already passed in the House of
Representatives.163 It has garnered the public support of many,
perhaps most, of the major U.S. public health organizations."
Nonetheless, it remains deeply controversial within the U.S. (and
global) tobacco control community. 165
161 Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, S. 625, 110th Cong.
(2007); H.R. 1108, 110th Cong. (2007) (as passed by House, July 30, 2007).
162 Many, including Justice Breyer and three other justices of the U.S. Supreme
Court, believed that Congress granted the FDA authority over tobacco products in the
original establishment of the agency. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
529 U.S. 120, 161-92 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
But a majority of the Court
disagreed and the Court's rejection of that authority established the impetus for the
present initative to enact an explicit delegation. Id. (majority opinion). See also
KESSLER, supra note 2 (personal report by the then-FDA Commissioner of the
investigatory and regulatory processes which formed the rationale for FDA authority).
163 S. 625; H.R. 1108; see Stephanie Saul, House Votes to Regulate Tobacco as a
Drug, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2008, at C2.
164 Campaign for Tobacco Free Kids, Organizations Supporting the FDA Tobacco
Legislation (2008), http://www.tobaccofreekids.org/reports/fda/organizations.pdf (last
visited Feb. 5, 2009) (listing 688 organizations as of July 28, 2008); see also Campaign
for Tobacco Free
Kids, Why We Need
S. 625/H.R.
1108 The
Kennedy/Cornyn/Waxman/Davis Bill Establishing FDA Regulation of Tobacco,
http://www.tobaccofreekids.org/research/factsheets/pdf/0190.pdf. (last visited Feb. 5,
2009) (discussing the status of tobacco legislation, providing statistics, and discussing
organizational support of tobacco regulation).
165 Compare Campaign for Tobacco Free Kids, FDA Authority Over Tobacco:
Legislation
Will
Protect
Kids
and
Save
Lives
(2008),
http://www.tobaccofreekids.org/reports/fda/ (last visited Feb. 5, 3009) (focusing on FDA
authority issues), and Editorial, Time to Regulate Big Tobacco, N.Y. TIMES, July 26,
2008, at A16 (calling for Congress to pass legislation allowing the FDA to regulate
tobacco as a drug) with Memorandum from Joel Nitzkin, Chair, Am. Assoc. of Pub.
Health Physicians Tobacco Control Task Force, to Am. Assoc. of Pub. Health Physicians
Bd., UpdatedSummary ofAAPHP Analysis of FDA/Tobacco Bill S.625; H.R. 1108 (June
19, 2008) http://www.aaphp.org/special/joelstobac/20080619TobcAdvocacy.pdf (last
visited Feb. 5, 2009) (representative of views of many tobacco control advocates who
oppose the FDA legislation), and Stephanie Saul, Black Caucus Split on Tobacco Issue,
N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2008, at Cl (concerns that menthol exception in FDA bill may
increase adverse health disparities suffered by African Americans). For a concise history
and overview of the pending legislation, see Christopher N. Banthin & Richard A.
Daynard, Room For Two In Tobacco Control: Limits On The Preemptive Scope Of The
Proposed Legislation Granting FDA Oversight Of Tobacco, 11 J. HEALTH CARE L. &
POL'Y 57, 59-65 (2008).
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The bill has two elements concerning tobacco product exports
from the United States:
First, in a powerful recognition, Congress' findings explicitly
acknowledge a link between tobacco and illegal activities abroad:
"(35) Tobacco products have been used'66 to facilitate andfinance
criminal activities both domestically and internationally. Illicit
trade of tobacco products has been linked to organized crime and
'
terrorist groups."167
Acting on this link, the bill mandates
determined efforts under a strong title, "Prevention of Illicit Trade
in Tobacco Products," with labeling, recordkeeping, and records
inspections.' 68
Second, the bill mandates an annual report from the Secretary
of Health and Human Services regarding:
(A) the nature, extent, and destination of United States tobacco
product exports that do not conform to tobacco product standards
established pursuant to this Act;
(B) the public health implications of such exports, including
any evidence of a negative public health impact; and
(C) recommendations or assessments of policy alternatives
available to Congress and the Executive Branch to reduce any
negative public health impact caused by such exports.'69
These provisions, the only items in the draft legislation that
address the U.S. tobacco industry's commercial activities
abroad, 7 ' beg the question of what should be done with the more
166 Note the particular use of passive voice. Congress states that "tobacco products
have been used' in association with criminal activities. Family Smoking Prevention and
Tobacco Control Act, S. 625, 110th Cong. § 2(35) (2007); H.R. 1108, 1 10th Cong. §
2(35) (2007) (as passed by House, July 30, 2008) (emphasis added). This passive voice

leaves unanswered the crucial question of who used tobacco products in this manner.
Was it the tobacco industry? Enquiring minds would wish to know.

167 Id. (emphasis added). For background information on this issue, see Campaign
for Tobacco Free Kids, Illicit Trade/Smuggling: Facts and Resources (2008),
http://tobaccofreecenter.org/resources/illicit-trade-smuggling/fact-sheets
(last visited
Feb. 8, 2009); see also The Framework Convention Alliance for Tobacco Control,
http://www.fctc.org/index.php?item=illicit-trade (last visited Feb. 8, 2009) (discussing

issues related and illicit tobacco trade and promoting greater control over tobacco trade).
Smuggling has been described as one of British American Tobacco's "key market entry
strategies" in the former Soviet region. Gilmore et al., supra note 21, at 2002.

168 S. 625 and H.R. 1108, §§ 301-02. Title II of H.R. 1108 also addresses the
problem of cross-border advertising ("from the United States to another country") by
mandating an empirical study of cross-border advertising and the provision of policy
recommendations as to how it can be prevented or eliminated. H.R. 1108 § 302.
169 H.R. 1108 § 103(l)(3). The provision also enables the Secretary to "establish
appropriate information disclosure requirements to carry out this subsection." Id.
170 These items appear to be the only relevant text drawn from the four instances of
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consequential matter-the enormous trade in manufactured tobacco
products by U.S.-based tobacco enterprises around the world.' 7 '

While this article sets aside the general debate regarding the merits
of the draft legislation, it is important to point out the profoundly
limited scale of action 7in2 the pending bill with regard to U.S.
tobacco business abroad.
As tobacco executives and lobbyists maneuver their way
through the halls of Congress, it is essential that elected decisionmakers and the public realize that these individuals are not
representatives of fine upstanding corporate citizenship and social
responsibility. The companies they represent have already been
found liable for a massive fifty-year fraud on the American public
in the United States' RICO litigation against the industry.' Judge
Gladys Kessler's 992 page decision, with its vast encyclopedic
fact findings, carefully documents multiple mechanisms of fraud
and deception. 174
the word "international" and six instances of the word "export" in the Family Smoking
Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, S. 625, 110th Cong. (2007). A search for
"foreign" brings up five instances with no relevant text (apart from an explicit rejection
of extraterritorial application to foreign entities not doing business in the U.S.) The
words "global," "abroad," and "overseas" have no instances in the 156 page bill. Id.
171 This is especially true considering the § 103 reporting and disclosure
requirements only apply to products that do not conform to future U.S. tobacco product
standards.
The non-illicit export of conforming products will remain entirely
unregulated. Id. § 103(l)(3)(1)(A).
172 Moreover, only one existing provision in U.S. law addresses the U.S. footprint in
tobacco commerce abroad, the so-called "Doggett Amendment," enacted annually since
1997.
See, e.g., Science, State, Justice, Commerce, and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 109-108, § 610, 199 Stat. 2290, 2336 (2005). The
amendment prohibits the U.S. Commerce, Justice, and State Departments "from
promoting the sale of tobacco products overseas, or working to reduce other countries'
non-discriminatory tobacco control regulations." Letter from Henry Waxman, Ranking
Member, House Comm. on Gov't Reform, and Lloyd Doggett, Member, House Comm.
on Ways and Means, to Hon. Condoleezza Rice, Sec'y of State (Dec. 5, 2006) (on file
with author), available at http://www.takingontobacco.org/trade/doggett.thai.html
(addressing a purported violation of the Doggett Amendment in Thailand). Robert
Weissman and Ross Hammond's 2000 call to strengthen and make permanent the
Doggett Amendment has gone unanswered. Robert Weissman & Ross Hammond,
International Tobacco Sales, 3(17) Foreign Policy in Focus 1 (Oct. 2000), availableat
http://www.fpif.org/pdf/vol3/17iftob.pdf, accord John Bloom, InternationalInterests in
U.S. Tobacco Legislation, ADVOCACY INSTITUTE HEALTH SCIENCE ANALYSIS PROJECT
(1998).
173 U.S. v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2006). See also
TOBACCO CONTROL LEGAL CONSORTIUM, THE VERDICT IS IN: FINDINGS FROM UNITED
STATES V. PHILIP MORRIS, (Kerry Cork & Maggie Mahoney, eds., Tobacco Control Legal

Consortium
2006),
available at
http://www.tobaccolawcenter.org/resources/
theverdictisin.pdf (print and online compilation of quotes from the court's findings "that
help tell the story in a direct and easily understandable way").
174 Philip Morris,449 F. Supp. 2d at 1.
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In a scathing introduction to her decision, which concludes that
the tobacco industry defendants carried out "a pattern of
17 6
racketeering activity""' in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c),
Judge Kessler writes with the unmistakable voice of outrage:
[This case] is about an industry, and in particular these
Defendants, that survives, and profits, from selling a highly
addictive product which causes diseases that lead to a
staggering number of deaths per year, an immeasurable
amount of human suffering and economic loss, and a
profound burden on our national health care system.
Defendants have known many of these facts for at least 50
years or more. Despite that knowledge, they have
consistently, repeatedly, and with enormous skill and
sophistication, denied these facts to the public, to the
Government, and to the public health community.
Moreover, in order to sustain the economic viability of their
companies, Defendants have denied that they marketed and
advertised their products to children under the age of
eighteen and to young people between the ages of eighteen
and twenty-one in order to ensure an adequate supply of
"replacement smokers," as older ones fall by the wayside
through death, illness, or cessation of smoking. In short,
Defendants have marketed and sold their lethal product
with zeal, with deception, with a single-minded focus on
theirfinancial success, and without regardfor the human
tragedy or social costs that success exacted.
175

Id. at 851.

176 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).

177 PhilipMorris, 449 F. Supp. 2d at 28 (emphasis added). Judge Kessler continues
to voice her outrage throughout the text of the opinion:
The purpose of the scheme was to obtain, from smokers and potential smokers,
money, i.e., the cost of cigarettes, to fill the coffers of the corporate
Defendants. Put more colloquially, and less legalistically, over the course of
more than 50 years, Defendants lied, misrepresented, and deceived the
American public, including smokers and the young people they avidly sought
as "replacement smokers," about the devastating health effects of smoking and
environmental tobacco smoke, they suppressed research, they destroyed
documents, they manipulated the use of nicotine so as to increase and
perpetuate addiction, they distorted the truth about low tar and light cigarettes
so as to discourage smokers from quitting, and they abused the legal system in
order to achieve their goal-to make money with little, if any, regard for
individual illness and suffering, soaring health costs, or the integrity of the legal
system.
Id. at 852 (emphasis added).
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FCPA violations are not included in the Kessler decision, but
these warrant particular consideration by decision makers in
Washington D.C. These violations are important because the
industry's global activities outside the United States now represent
the principal share of the industry's overall commerce."' If, as the
B&W story reported here suggests, U.S. tobacco executives have
engaged in illegal and corrupt business practices abroad or, as
contemplated in Part V of this article, manslaughter or murder,
then American policymakers should take suitable measures to
address the industry's global activities while they deliberate on
how to regulate domestic tobacco commerce.1 79
American
policymakers should address these global activities for precisely
the same reason Congress first enacted the FCPA-to foster the
United States' moral reputation abroad. 8 ° After all, since U.S.
brands are the leaders among the world's best selling cigarettes, 8'
178 The combined U.S.-based Philip Morris companies represent the world's largest
tobacco multinational company. Philip Morris International alone "held an estimated
15.6% share of the international cigarette market outside of the US" in 2007. Philip
Morris International, http://www.philipmorrisinternational.com (click "About Us") (last
visited Feb. 17, 2009). By units, eighty percent of its sales are outside the United States.
GLOBAL PARTNERSHIPS FOR TOBACCO CONTROL ESSENTIAL ACTION, ET AL., CALL TO
GOVERNMENTS WORLDWIDE TO TAKE ACTION TO PREVENT AN INDEPENDENT PHILIP
MORRIS INTERNATIONAL FROM WORSENING
THE GLOBAL TOBACCO EPIDEMIC,

http://www.philipmorrisbreakup.org/calltogovs/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2009).
179 Of the world's three largest tobacco multinationals, the two largest, representing
over thirty percent of global cigarette market share, have sufficient ties in the U.S. to be
subject to stringent regulation. Both are issuers of securities traded on U.S. exchanges.
Philip Morris International shares are traded on the New York Stock Exchange and
British-American Tobacco shares are traded on the American Stock Exchange. See, e.g.,
PHILIP MORRIS, INT'L, INVESTOR FACT SHEET: SECOND QUARTER 2008 1 (2008), available

at
http://media.corporate-ir.net/media-files/irol/14/146476/FS/q2-2008-factsheet.pdf.
(last visited Feb. 5, 2009); BRITISH AMERICAN TOBACCO, ANNUAL REPORT AND
ACCOUNTS 50 (2008), available at http://www.bat.com/group/sites/uk 3mnfen.nsf/vw
PagesWebLive/DO52AD6H/$FILE/medMD7D9KKN.pdfopenelement. Japan Tobacco
International is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Japan Tobacco, Inc., based in Japan with
its public shares traded on the Tokyo Stock Exchange. See generally JAPAN TOBACCO,
INC., ANNUAL REPORT 2008 (2008), available at http://www.jti.co.jp/JTI_E/IR/08
/annual2008/annual2008 E all.pdf (detailing financial status of corporation for fiscal
year ending March 31, 2008). Thus, while the Japanese parliament is in the lawful
position to consider how JT's global activities should be regulated, the United States
may provide a constructive model to follow.
180 See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 95-114, at 4 (1977) (discussing adverse effect of corporate
foreign
practices
on image
of U.S.
businesses abroad),
available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/history/1977/senaterpt.html;
H.R. Rep. No.
95-640, at 5 (1977), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/history/1 977/
houseprt.html. (last visted Feb. 5, 2009).
181 Led by Marlboro, the world's number one selling brand and L&M, "the fourth
most popular brand," Philip Morris International alone produces seven of the top fifteen
most popular brands.
Philip Morris International, http://www.philipmorris
international.com (follow "About Us" hyperlink; then follow "Our Brands" hyperlink)
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how can the millions of future deaths from these
products possibly
82
abroad?'
reputation
States'
United
benefit the
Appropriate policy measures would include: (1) carrying out a
thorough investigation following from the circumstances revealed
in the industry documents 83 (2) compelled disclosure and internal
controls by the tobacco industry as to their political activities
abroad, and (3) strict regulation of the industry's international
business practices.'84
1. Investigation
The B&W story generates many questions that need to be
asked and deserve to be answered. Considering that B&W
executives brazenly aimed towards violating the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act,' 85 it seems entirely appropriate for the U.S.
Department of Justice and the U.S. Congress to investigate
whether B&W executives engaged in similar plans in other
nations, or whether other tobacco companies' executives carried
on business in this manner. 8 6 Most importantly, given Judge
Kessler's findings of the tobacco industry defendants as a rogue
recidivist enterprise,'87 the American public ought to know, by
virtue of a proper investigation, whether this kind of corrupt

(last visited Jan. 23, 2009). Marlboro has also been ranked as the tenth most popular
brand in any product line. Global Brand Scorecard: The 100 Top Brands, BUSINESS
WEEK, Aug. 1, 2005, at 90.
182 Aside from pragmatic concerns about national reputation, powerful moral
reasons are certainly present as well. See, e.g., Bloom supra note 172 ("The role played
by U.S. interests in creating this global health problem increases the moral obligation to
help address it."). Id.
183 See discussion supra Part I1.
184 Weissman and Hammond also recommend the Doggett Amendment (applicable
to U.S. government agencies) be broadened, strengthened, and made permanent.
Weissman & Hammond, supra note 172, at 2-3. See also Bloom supra note 162,
Executive Summary ("Other important proposals would ... provide tax incentives for
U.S. tobacco firms that observe minimum public health standards in their overseas
operations; assess a fee on tobacco companies to support international tobacco control
efforts; and require tobacco companies to develop company-wide programs to ensure
compliance with public health and anti-smuggling laws in the U.S. and abroad.").
185 If the arrangements with Nakao and Yokoyama did not pan out, this does not
seem to be from a lack of interest. See supra text accompanying notes 22-41. One does
not find any B&W documents from Hughes or Stungis suggesting reluctance or
questioning the propriety of the proposed scheme. See supra notes 24, 26, 28, 33, 49,
54, 59, 62 and accompanying text.
186 Noting the other indicia of corrupt tobacco industry policy interference
documented in the reports described earlier. See supra notes 21-22.
187 U.S. v. Phillip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 211, 28 (D.D.C. 2006).
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international activity is presently occurring. 8 8 Thus, while the
Congress is considering the future of tobacco regulation in the
United States with hearings and related activities, these global
issues should also be in Congress' careful purview.
2. Disclosure andInternal Controls

The accounting provisions of the FCPA already mandate
disclosure of corrupt payments by issuers,'89 but these restrictions
do not, for example, extend as far as the requisite disclosures of
internal domestic documents nor in the same comprehensive
manner as the 1998 Multistate Settlement Agreement (MSA)' 90
If corrupt practices are evidenced in the investigation proposed
above, this would provide an appropriate rationale for extending
the reach of statutorily mandated disclosure obligations on any
aspect of political activity anywhere overseas by tobacco industry
entities under U.S. jurisdiction. 91 These obligations should
substantively combine the FCPA's accounting provisions and the
type of MSA disclosures regarding lobbying activities applicable
domestically.

92

Similarly, the internal accounting controls provisions of the
FCPA mandate issuers to "devise and maintain a system of
internal accounting controls sufficient to provide reasonable
assurance" of compliance with the FCPA's accounting and anti-

188 Present activities not only implicate the FCPA, but also the United States' treaty
obligations under the "new international norms" such as the United Nations Convention
Against Corruption, G.A. Res. 58/4,
16, U.N. Doc. A/RES/58/4 (Oct. 31, 2003)
(opened for signature Dec. 9, 2003 and entered into force Dec. 14, 16, 2005), available
at http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/Publications/Convention/08-50026
E.pdf, and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Convention
on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions, art. 1, Dec. 17, 1997, DAFFE/IME/BR(97)16/FINAL, 137 I.L.M. 1.
(entered into force Feb. 15, 1999) available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/4/18/
38028044.pdf. See generally DEMING, supra note 94, Part II (discussing various
international anti-bribery and foreign corruption conventions).
189 FCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A) (1983) (specifically mandating the fair and
accurate disclosure of all transactions of the issuer). See DEMING, supra note 94, at Ch. 3
(discussing the FCPA accounting and record keeping provisions).
190 Nat'l Assoc. of Atty's Gen., Multistate Settlement with the Tobacco Industry,
Part IV (Nov. 23, 1998) http://www.library.ucsf edu/tobacco/litigation/msa.pdf; see
generally Richard A. Daynard et al., Implicationsfor Tobacco Control of the Multistate
Settlement, 91 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1967 (2001) (discussing the implications of the
Master Settlement Agreement on tobacco regulation).
191 See FCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A) (1983).
192 Bloom, supra note 172, at sec. 5.
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bribery provisions.'93 Similar measures for international tobacco
control, i.e., mandating "company-wide programs to ensure
compliance with public health and anti-smuggling laws in the U.S.
and abroad" deserve Congressional consideration.' 94
B. The Framework Convention on Tobacco Control and
Strict Regulation of InternationalBusiness Practicesin

U.S. Law.
Aside from disclosure requirements, Congress, regulators (if
duly empowered by the Congress),195 and the courts should not
only consider regulating the U.S. tobacco industry's domestic
business practices but also the entirety of its overseas
operations. 196

At one time, U.S. tobacco control regulations were among the
most advanced in the world and perhaps could have served as an
adequate model for export.'97

This is no longer the case as far

stricter regulatory regimes have become widespread, including
complete and comprehensive bans on advertising and product
sponsorship,198 graphic warnings with shocking imagery on
product packaging,' 99 nationally mandated comprehensive smoke193 FCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(B) (1983). See generally DEMINGsupra note 94,
at 25-27 (providing an explanation of the FCPA's internal accounting provisions).
194 Bloom, supra note 172, at 1.
195 Compare the constrained approach in the pending FDA draft legislation, as
explained supra notes 151-62 and accompanying text.
196 For early presentations along these lines, see Weissman & Hammond, supra note
172, at 3, and Bloom, supra note 172, at sec. 5.
197 See generally Tobacco Export Reform Act of 1989, H.R. 1249, 101st Cong. (1st
Sess. 1989) (unenacted bill proposing that U.S. tobacco companies be required to
observe U.S. labeling and advertising laws in overseas sales activities); 135 Cong. Rec.
E627 (1989) (statement of Rep. Levine introducing the proposed law). Of course, the
U.S. is not the only nation that has demonstrated political leadership and programmatic
ingenuity in tobacco control.
198 See, e.g., CAMPAIGN FOR TOBACCO-FREE KIDS, ADVERTISING AND PROMOTION:
THE ESSENTIAL FACTS 3 (2007), http://tobaccofreecenter.org/files/pdfs/ADPR facts.pdf,
Henry Saffer, Tobacco Advertising and Promotion, in TOBACCO CONTROL IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 215, 231 (Prabhat Jha & Frank Chaloupka, eds. 2000), available
at http://wwwl.worldbank.org/tobacco/tcdc.asp.
Cf YUSSUF SALOOJEE & ROSS
HAMMOND, WHO, FATAL DECEPTION:

THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY'S "NEW"

GLOBAL

STANDARDS FOR TOBACCO MARKETING 9 (2001), available at http://repositories.cdlib
.org/context/tc/article/1103/type/pdf/viewcontent/ (describing studies on comprehensive
smoking bans across the world). See generally WHO.int, Advertising and Promotion
Bans, http://www.who.int/tobacco/training/successstories/advertising/en/
index.html
(last visited Oct. 24, 2008) (providing access to reports on bans in Iran, Norway,
Thailand, Botswana, and Croatia).
199 As of June 5, 2008, seventeen nations required graphic picture warnings.
PHYSICIANS FOR A SMOKE-FREE CANADA, PICTURE-BASED CIGARETrE WARNINGS (2008),
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free workplaces laws, 20 ' and negotiations for an emerging protocol
regarding illicit tobacco trade, in which the United States is not
participating.20 ' The overseas operations of the U.S. tobacco
industry is already subject to a mandate by Judge Kessler to end
deceptive product labeling and branding with terms such as "light"
and "mild., 20 2 While this court order is a start, it is hardly
sufficient to accomplish the necessary tasks.
At a minimum, the U.S. tobacco industry should be statutorily
barred from carrying out nefarious business practices abroad that
are prohibited at home. 2 3 But as to standards where domestically
the United States is behind emerging global best practices, it
would be inversely hypocritical to allow the industry a freer hand
at home than it plays by abroad. Accordingly, the U.S. Senate
http://www.smoke-free.ca/warnings/countries%20and%201aws.htm (providing pictures
of or links to pictures of warnings on packages already in use around the world). See
also ROB CUNNINGHAM, CANADIAN CANCER SOCIETY, PACKAGE WARNINGS: OVERVIEW
OF INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS 2, 4 (2007) (comparing size and placement of
package warnings).
3-4 (2008)
200 See, e.g., CAMPAIGN FOR TOBACCO-FREE KIDS, SMOKE-FREE LAWS
http://tobaccofreecenter.org/resources/smokefree laws (listing national enactments in
Bermuda, Bhutan, France, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, New Zealand, Norway,
Panama, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, the United Kingdom and Uruguay). Niger has
joined this elite club with a comprehensive enactment in July 2008 that includes the
possibility of imprisonment. David Lewis, Niger Threatens Illegal Smokers With Jail,
1, http://www.reuters.com/article/latestcrisis/idUSL
REUTERS AFRICA, Jul. 18, 2008,
18922571.
201 See Intergovernmental Negotiating Body on a Protocol on Illicit Trade in
Tobacco Products: Second Session, Oct. 20-25, 2008, List of Participants,20, WHO
Doc. FCTC/COP/INB/IT2/DIV/2 Rev. 1, available at http://www.who.intlgb/fctc
/PDF/it2/FCTC-COP-INB-IT2-DIV2-RI.pdf (showing the United States to be a mere
observer as opposed to a participant in the proceedings). See also WHO.int, First
Session of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Body on a Protocol on Illicit Trade in
Tobacco Products, http://www.who.int/fctc/cop/firstsession inb/en/index.html (last
visited Oct. 28, 2008) (providing description of negotiating body's accomplishments in
the first session of February 2008); WHO.int, Intergovernmental Negotiating Body on a
Protocol on Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products, http://www.who.int/gb/fctc/E/E-it1.htm
(last visited Oct. 28, 2008) (providing direct links to documentation of the first session of
the Intergovernmental Negotiating Body). See generally FRAMEWORK CONVENTION
ALLIANCE, COMMENTS ON THE TEMPLATE FOR A PROTOCOL ON ILLICIT TRADE IN TOBACCO

PRODUCTS (2007), available at http://www.fctc.org/dmdocuments/fca-2008-inb-illicitinternational
(analyzing
trade-inb I-briefing-comments-on-protocol-template-en.pdf
efforts to criminalize and eliminate illicit trafficking in tobacco products).
202 United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 477 F. Supp. 2d 191, 197 (D.D.C.
2007); see also Judge Says Tobacco Companies Can't Use 'Light'LabelOverseas, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 17, 2007, at C9; Statement of William V. Corr, Executive Director,
Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, Federal Judge Orders Tobacco Companies to Stop
Deceiving Foreign Consumers as Well as Those in U.S. (Mar. 16, 2007), available at
http://www.tobaccofreekids.org/Script/DisplayPressRelease.php3?Display=974.
203 See Weissman & Hammond, supra note 172, at 3 and Bloom, supra note 172.
These authors also suggested U.S. policy prohibits the inclusion of tobacco in any new
bilateral trade agreements. Id.
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should quickly ratify the Framework Convention on Tobacco
Control (FCTC)0 4 and join the other 160 nations... around the
world who have agreed to work together for tobacco control,
establishing minimum policy standards by both mandates and
guidelines. °6 The United States should then aim to reassume its
leadership status in global tobacco control by meeting, exceeding,
or developing new best practices among FCTC nations.20 7
C. The Tobacco Industry's Dirty Dealings Should Be
Consideredby the FCTC's Conference of the Partiesin
Developing Strong Guidelines Concerningthe Framework
Convention on Tobacco Control'sArticle 5.3.
As mentioned above, the FCTC has become an international
standard. Of 195 eligible parties, 160 or eighty-two percent have
joined in rapid succession since 2003.2o8 Only thirty-five nations

remain on the sidelines, and of these, only three-the United States,
Indonesia, and Ethiopia-are among the twenty-five most populous
nations, ranking numbers three, four, and seventeen,
respectively.2" 9 Accordingly, 85.3% of the world's population
204 World Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, opened
for signature June 16, 2003, 2302 U.N.T.S. 166 (entered into force Feb. 27, 2005)
[hereinafter FCTC]. See generally infra Part D.
205 WHO, FULL LIST OF SIGNATORIES AND PARTIES TO THE WHO FRAMEWORK
CONVENTION ON TOBACCO CONTROL (2008), http://www.who.int/fctc/signatoriesjparties/
en/print.html (providing list of signatories and parties as of September 2008). In the
meantime, the United States' dramatic outlier status vis-A-vis this treaty regime is
graphically apparent in a GIS map. Id. (follow "See Map" hyperlink; the green
represents contracting parties). See also infra notes 208-210 and accompanying text.
206 This presumes the United States will be a constructive team player in tobacco
control initiatives. U.S. participation is not desirable if our government will use its status
as an FCTC party to impede global tobacco control policy progress. See generally
Weissman & Hammond, supra note 172, at 2 (describing how U.S. government
involvement in previous international trade agreements undermined attempts at global
tobacco control).
207 Another means by which the United States can re-establish a leadership position
is with generous funding of FCTC-driven international operations under the auspices of
the World Health Organization's Tobacco Free Initiative. Weissman & Hammond,
supra note 172, at 3 and Bloom, supra note 172. This would build upon the work
already underway by the private Bloomberg and Gates Foundations. See Donald G.
McNeil Jr., Pledging $500 Million, Bloomberg And Gates Take Aim at Smoking, N.Y.
TIMES, July 24, 2008, at B 1; Editorial, Big Tobacco, Meet Big Philanthropy,N.Y. TIMES,
July 29, 2008, at A18.
208 It has been said that the 160 countries' adoption of the FCTC represents the
fastest global adoption of any international treaty sponsored by the United Nations, but
the author has found no means to verify this claim. For FCTC ratifications by month and
year see WHO, supra note 205.
209 See WHO.int, WHO Member States that are Not Parties to the WHO Framework
Convention on Tobacco Control, http://www.who.int/fctc/nonparties/en/index.html (last

2009

POLITICAL INFLUENCE BUYING IN JAPAN

lives in countries that are parties to the treaty.21 °
In light of the history carefully documented by a WHO special
research committee, l' tobacco industry interference with tobacco
control policy was a specific concern that the World Health
Assembly conveyed to the FCTC drafters in a plenary resolution at
its meeting in Geneva in May 2001 212
The resolution provided:
The Fifty-fourth World Health Assembly
Noting with great concern the findings of the Committee of
Experts on Tobacco Industry Documents, namely, that the
tobacco industry has operatedfor years with the express
intention of subverting the role of governments and of
WHO in implementing public health policies to combat the
tobacco epidemic;
Understanding that public confidence would be
enhanced by transparencyof affiliation between delegates
to the Health Assembly and other meetings of WHO and the
tobacco industry,
1. URGES Member States to be aware of affiliations
between the tobacco industry and members of their
delegations;
2. URGES WHO and Member States to be alert to any
efforts by the tobacco industry to continue its subversive
practice and to assure the integrity of health policy
development in any WHO meeting and in national
governments;
3. CALLS ON WHO to continue to inform Member
States of activities of the tobacco industry that have a
negative impact on tobacco controlefforts.2 13
visited Feb. 5, 2009).
210 WHO, UPDATED STATUS OF THE WHO FCTC: RATIFICATION AND ACCESSION BY

COUNTRY 2 (2008), http://www.fctc.org/index.php?option=comdocman&task=doc_
download&gid=13 l&Itemid = 159.
211 See generally WHO Report, supra note 22 (outlining the instances of
interference). See supra note 21 for other indicia of corrupt tobacco industry policy
interference.
212 W.H.A. Res. 54.18, 5, WHO Doc. A54/52 (May 22, 2001), available at
http://www.who.int/tobacco/framework/whaeb/ea5452%5b l%5d.pdf.
213 Id. See generally WHO.int, A History of the WHO Framework Convention on
Tobacco Control, http://www.who.int/fctc/history/en/index.html (last visited Feb. 5,
2009) for a full collection of archived documents relating to the negotiations and drafting
of the treaty.
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Accordingly, this key issue was explicitly addressed in the
FCTC's Article 5.3, unanimously adopted by the World Health
Assembly on May 21, 2003: "In setting and implementing their
public health policies with respect to tobacco control, Parties
shall act to protect these policies from commercial and other
vested interests
of the tobacco industry in accordance with
214
nationallaw."

Article 5.3's implementation is presently under active
development. The crucial nature of Article 5.3 was elaborated at
the Second Conference of FCTC Parties (COP) in Bangkok,
Thailand from June 30 to July 6, 2007, which established a
working group for the elaboration of guidelines on Article 5.3 and
sought "a progress report, if possible draft guidelines" to the Third
COP in November 2008 in Durban, South Africa.215
In the lead-up to the Durban session, a nine-month intensive
international process led by Key Facilitators, Brazil, Ecuador, the
Netherlands, Palau, and Thailand, resulted in a fifteen-page set of
draft guidelines (Draft Guidelines) and resources for
implementation of Article 5.3 delivered in advance to the
gathering of nations in Durban.216
The Draft Guidelines include eight specific recommended
actions "deemed vital for dealing with tobacco industry
interference in public health policies:"
1) Raise awareness about the addictive and harmful
nature of tobacco products and about tobacco industry
interference with Parties' tobacco control policies.
2) Establish measures to limit interactions with the
214 FCTC, supra note 204, at art. 5.3. This provision has come to be understood as
being most significant with regards to process. The FCTC's other provisions already
aim to ensure that domestic tobacco control policies prevail over tobacco industry
benefits. Telephone Interview between Jonathan Liberman, Pol'y Dir., Framework
Convention Alliance, and author (Aug. 22, 2008).
215 Conference of the Parties to the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco
Control: Second Session, Bangkok, Thail., June 30-July 6, 2007, Decisions, 32, WHO
Doc. A/FCTC/COP/1/DIV/9 (Sept. 20, 2007), available at http://www.who.int/gb/
fctc/PDF/cop2/FCTCCOP2_DIV9-en.pdf. See generally WHO.int, Second Session of
the
Conference
of
the
Parties
to
the
WHO
FCTC,
http://www.who.int/fctc/cop/second sessioncop/en/index.html (last visited Oct. 31,
2008) (providing a concise summary of the Second Session decisions).
216 See Conference of the Parties to the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco
Control: Third Session, Durban, S. Afr., Nov. 17-22, 2008, ElaborationofGuidelinesfor
Implementation ofArticles 5.3 of the Convention,
1-6, WHO Doc. FCTC/COP3/5
(Aug. 21, 2008), available at http://www.who.int/gb/fctc/PDF/cop3/FCTCCOP3_5en.pdf.
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tobacco industry and ensure the transparency of those
interactions that occur.
3) Reject partnerships and non-binding or nonenforceable agreements and partnerships with the tobacco
industry.
4) Avoid conflicts of interest for government officials
and employees.
5) Require that information collected from the tobacco
industry be transparent and accurate.
6) Denormalize and regulate activities described as
"corporate social responsibility" by the tobacco industry.
7) Do not give privileged treatment to tobacco
companies.
8) Treat State-owned tobacco companies in the same
way as any other tobacco industry.217
The Draft Guidelines quickly drew responses from the
Framework Convention Alliance (FCA), a NGO body of more
than 350 organizations from over 100 nations,218 urging a number
of revisions to the Draft Guidelines to "provide strong, clear
guidance to Parties in implementing this critical Article."219 As
succinctly stated previously by the FCA's Policy Director:
The biggest obstacle to effective FCTC implementation is
the tobacco industry. The tobacco industry is different from
other industries. Its interests are in direct conflict with those
of public health and the objective of the FCTC. It does, and
always has done, everything to weaken, delay and
undermine tobacco control. Parties to the FCTC have a
legal obligation under Article 5.3 to protect their public
health policies with respect to tobacco control from
commercial and other vested interests of the tobacco

217 Id.
14. Moreover, "[p]arties are encouraged to implement measures beyond
those provided for by these guidelines, and nothing in these guidelines shall prevent a
Party from imposing stricter requirements that are consistent with these
recommendations." Id.
218 See
FCTC.org, What
is the Framework
Convention Alliance?,
http://www.fctc.org/index.php?option=com content&view=article&id=2&Itemid=9 (last
visited Feb. 5, 2009). The author of this article is an FCA individual member and serves
on its Policy Committee.
219 FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ALLIANCE, COP-3 POLICY BRIEFING ARTICLE 5.3
INTERFERENCE 1 (2008), available at http://www.fctc.org/dmdocuments/COP3_Article
5_3_%20briefing.pdf.
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industry.22 °
Working with a similar approach in the Draft Guidelines, the
FCA has called for Article 5.3 to be implemented by the FCTC's
parties with four Guiding Principles underlying all tobacco control
policies:
Principle 1: There is a fundamental and irreconcilable conflict
between the tobacco industry's interests and public health policy.
Principle 2: Parties, when dealing with the tobacco industry or
those working to further its interests, should be accountable and
transparent.
Principle 3: Parties should require the tobacco industry and
those working to further its interests to operate and act in a manner
that is accountable and transparent.
Principle 4: Because their products are lethal, tobacco industry
entities should
not be granted incentives to establish or run their
2 1
businesses.
In short, the story revealed by the B&W documents in this
article and the apparent illegality of the activity revealed therein
highlight the need for FCTC parties to adopt strong, clear, and
effective Guidelines for Article 5.3 in Durban
in accordance with
222
above.
presented
Principles
Guiding
the
22 3
V. The Untouchables: Criminal Liability and Tobacco.
If only there were evil people somewhere insidiously
committing evil deeds, and it were necessary only to separatethem
from the rest of us and destroy them. But the line dividing good
and evil cuts through the heart of every human being. And who is

220 E-mail from Jonathan Liberman, Pol'y Dir., Framework Convention Alliance, to
author (May 9, 2008) (on file with author).
221 FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ALLIANCE, supra note 219, at 7.

222 Postscript note: The Durban conference took place in November 2008 while this
article was in editorial production. Delegates adopted strong and comprehensive
Article 5.3 Guidelines, substantially meeting the FCA's aspirations. See WHO
FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON TOBACCO CONTROL, THIRD SESSION OF THE CONFERENCE

OF THE PARTIES (COP3), http://www.who.int/fctc/cop/cop3

in briefEN.pdf, at 2;

FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ALLIANCE, Thank You, South Africa!, 85 BULLETIN 1
(2008), available at http://www.fctc.org/dmdocuments/Issue%2085%20saturday.pdf.

An overview report about this article and a link to a pre-publication draft were
distributed to over 600 Durban delegates by the Framework Convention Alliance on
the first day of the gathering helping to evidence the vital need for action.
http://www.fctc.org/index.php?option=comdocman&task=doc-download&gid=291
&Itemid=2 1.
223 THE UNTOUCHABLES (Paramount Pictures 1987).
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willing to destroy a piece of his own heart?
This is a story about violent crime. Unlike many other
dealings in dirty politics, if the tobacco industry succeeds with
political corruption, there is a terrible impact: people die. People
die if the industry's corrupt influence will have government
leaders opening their markets for powerful tobacco transnationals,
increasing their business and thus its deadly toll. 225 People die
when tobacco control policies that might have been implemented
at the national or international level are corruptly blocked or

defeated.226 People die when tobacco industry executives "over
the course of more than 50 years, . . . lie[], misrepresent[], and
deceive[] the American public, . . .suppress[] research, destroy[]
documents, . . .and ... abuse[] the legal system in order ... to
make money.' 227

What is the correct term for acts that leave our global society
with millions of dead and dying? Smoking has caused over one
hundred million deaths in the twentieth century, and by current
estimates, manufactured tobacco products are expected to cause
one billion deaths in the twenty-first century.228 Can we just call
224 1 ALEKSANDR ISAEVICH SOLZHENITSYN, THE GULAG ARCHIPELAGO, 1918-1956,

at 168 (Thomas P. Whitney & H.T. Willetts trans., Westview Press 1997).
225 This is suggested by the B&W story reported here. See supra Part II. Regarding
the adverse impact of market-opening measures on tobacco consumption and disease in
Japan and Asia, see generally Kaori Honjo & Ichiro Kawachi, Effects of Market
Liberalization on Smoking in Japan, 9 TOBACCO CONTROL 193 (2000) and Frank J.
Chaloupka & Adit Laizuthai, U.S. Trade Policy and Cigarette Smoking in Asia (Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 5542, 1996) (documenting increased
smoking prevalence in Japan Taiwan, South Korea, and Thailand).
226 See generally WHO Report, supra note 22 (noting tobacco companies' efforts to
undercut scientific research on the dangers of smoking and thereby downplay the need
for control policies).
227 United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 1, 852 (D.D.C. 2006);
see also JAMES WILLIAM COLEMAN, THE CRIMINAL ELITE: UNDERSTANDING WHITE
COLLAR CRIME 73 (4th ed. 1998).
The manufacturer that produces and sells a dangerous product may
violate some of our most deeply held ethical standards, but it does not
automatically violate the law. Most of the cases examined here involve
not only the manufacture of dangerous products, but also the fraudulent
or deceptive statements made by corporate officials to avoid a sales
disaster or costly civil suits. It is these fraudulent statements that turn
corporate irresponsibility into corporate crime.
Id.
228 WHO, WHO REPORT ON THE GLOBAL TOBACCO EPIDEMIC, 2008: THE MPOWER
PACKAGE, 14 (2008) (citing Richard Peto et al., Mortalityfrom Smoking Worldwide, 52
BRIT. MED. BULL. 12, 20 (1996) and Richard Peto & Alan Lopez, Future Worldwide
Health Effects of CurrentSmoking Patterns, in CRITICAL ISSUES INGLOBAL HEALTH 154,
158 (C. Everett Koop et al. eds., 2001)) (emphasis added), available at
http://www.who.int/tobacco/mpower/mpower report tobacco_crisis 2008.pdf
Upon
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this business?229
Ordinarily, a defendant's intentional act with a malicious state
of mind that legally causes the death of a living human being is
known as murder.23 Homicides that are "not bad enough to be
murder but which are too bad to be no crime whatsoever" are
described as manslaughter.2 3' There is also "the other extreme,
2 32
justifiable or excusable homicide, which is not criminal at all.
Since the United States' legislature and judiciary has not yet
deemed the marketing and sale of manufactured tobacco products
to be murder or manslaughter,2 33 the marketing and sale must
represent justifiable or excusable homicide. People are dying by
intentional acts of individuals who know the products they sell
lead to death. And yet there is no crime?
While something seems terribly amiss, perhaps the lack of
legislative or judicial action is simply because too many people are
complicit in this industry. From the growers, manufacturers,
employees, shareholders,
lawyers, lobbyists, advertising
executives, and public relations consultants, to the retail network's
owner of the comer grocery and the cashier at the local drug store,
a staggering number of people are involved with the deadly
tobacco trade. Ultimately, we are probably all connected in
through our families, friends, and acquaintances. 234
his receiving an award for his and Sir Richard Doll's groundbreaking work in this field,
Peto noted that "if we put our minds together and work on this problem, we may be able
to prevent a couple hundred million of those deaths." Sir Richard Peto, Remarks on
Receiving Luther L. Terry Award at 13th World Conference on Tobacco or Health (July
15, 2006) (as noted by author).
229 Robert F. Kennedy Jr.'s incisive observation that "Killing one man is murder;
killing millions is a statistic" comes to mind. I DREAM THINGS THAT NEVER WERE...
AND SAY WHY NOT: QUOTATIONS OF ROBERT F. KENNEDY 36 (Jane Wilkie & Rod
McKuen eds., 1970).
230 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 733 (4th ed. 2003).
231 Id. at 775.
232 Id.
233 The primary exceptions are B&W's own in-house legal counsel's candid
observations quoted at the start of this paper and Jonathan Liberman, supra note 1, at 9.
See Ernest Pepples, supra note 1 and accompanying text. Other notable presentations
include Nagoya Japan attorney Shizuo Itoh's unsuccessful cases which he filed seeking
an inquest of prosecution against Japan Tobacco executives (first for murder, then for
attempted murder), and a moot court debate by law students at Monash and Melbourne
Universities in Australia. See Levin, supra note 19, at 120 n.154; Jonathan Liberman &
Ron Borland, Australia: Lawyers Ponder Tobacco Firms' Criminal Liability, 10
TOBACCO CONTROL 205, 205 (2001).
234 Coleman is far less forgiving and far more pragmatic in his assessment of "Why
Justice Fails." Denying that white collar crime is any less harmful than street crime, he
points to the personal advantages of privilege, the advantages of corporate organization,
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And so, it remains profoundly difficult to end this 100-year old
man-made commercial and industrial disaster having millions of
persons entwined in the killing and the dying. 235
After all, "[W]ho
236
is willing to destroy a piece of his own heart?

the ability to hide crimes, techniques of obstruction, and the corruption of enforcement.
COLEMAN, supra note 227, at 161-70. Undoubtedly, these factors may be evident in the
tobacco industry's killings as well.
Readers may also consider the incredible challenge faced by those who aimed to
end what was surely the most horrific commerce in human history, yet also not a crime the New World's slave trade industry and finance. A piece of this story is powerfully
told in AMAzING GRACE (Bristol Bay Productions 2006).
235 Certainly, the FCTC is the most important global endeavor underway in this
field. Again, the author urges the U.S. to join in that global effort as a positively
contributing party. One notable effort answering Professor Richard Daynard's important
call for "end-game" scenarios in tobacco control (see Richard Daynard, The Engle
Verdicts and Tobacco Litigation, 321 BRIT. MED. J. 312, 313 (2000)) is Ron Borland's
suggestion for a regulated market model, A Strategy for Controlling the Marketing of
Tobacco Products: A Regulated Market Model, 12 TOBACCO CONTROL 374, 374 (2003).
But see Jonathan Liberman, The Future of Tobacco Regulation: A Response to a
Proposalfor FundamentalInstitutional Change, 15 TOBACCO CONTROL 333, 334 (2006).
More recent efforts include Steven Sugarman's suggestion for a fee-based market
incentive structure to reduce consumption. See Steven D. Sugarman, Should Tobacco
Companies Be Required to Reduce Their Number of Customers?, ALTERNET.ORG, Jan.
18, 2008, para. 5, http://www.altemet.org/story/73783/.
236 ALEKSANDR ISAEVICH SOLZHENITSYN, supra note 224.
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